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5. Patient, suffering from a painful skin eruption on his leg consulted Physic'
for treatment. Physician diagnosed the trouble as eczema and ~rescribed X-ray t~:~t
ment. The first treatment caused Patient's leg to swell and the second treatme t
caus~d such a severe reaction as to necessitate the admission of Patient to a n
hosp1tal. Patient suffered excruciating pain and incurred an expense for treatment
in the amount of $1,500.
T S5
.Patient brought an action for damages against Physician in the Circuit Court f
G1les County, alleging malpractice. Physician filed grounds of defense denv;ng 0
.
any
rna1prac t'~c~ or neg 1'1gence. Upon the tr1al
of the case the only witness was J~Patient
who test1f1ed to the matters s et out in the first paragraph of this question and
rested. Physician's counsel thereupon moved the court for summary judgment in his
favor.
How should the court rule on this motion?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The motion for summary judgment should be granted provided
that a motion to strike has been made and granted. In this case expert evidence
must be offered by plaintiff as the issues involved are not capable of being determi.ned by layman without the benefit of such evidence. See Rule 3:20 as effective
June 1, 1957.

•

7. AZ fu"e& Bee and Carson in the Circuit Court for $5,000 for personal injuries
alleged to have been sustained by him, when Bee's automobi~e, in which Ames was a
guest passenger, collided with one operated by Carson. Bee consults you and informs
you that he holds the past due note of Ames for $10,000 and a bond made by Carson
for $6.•500, also past due, and asks you whether he may enforce collection of either
or both of these items in the present action.
How ought you to advise him?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Bee may sue Ames on the note. Rule 3:8 reads in part, "--a defendant may, at his option, plead as a counterclaim any cause of action at law
for a money judgment in personam that he has against the plaintiff---".
Bee cannot sue on the bond. Rule 3:9 reads in pa~t, "A defendant may, at his option
plead as a cross-claim any cause of action that he has against one or more other
defendants growing out of a~1y matter pleaded in the notice of motionfor judgment."
The bond did not grow out of any matter pleaded in the notice of motion for judgment.
vm~t..n
a res1aenli or Pennsylvania, was killed in an automobile accident occurring
~~the city of Richmond. His Administrator, Jones,,qualifi~d properly_in Pennsylvani~
and instituted action in the proper court in the C1ty of R1chmond aga1nst Kyle, the
owner and driver of the opposing automobile for $25,000 damages for the death of
'"'m ith. The accident occurred on July 29, 1956. Smith was killed instantly. Jones,
~he Administrator, appointed by the Pennsylvania ·court instituted his action for
damages May 1 1 1958. Kyle by his attorney promptly filed a motion to dismiss the
acti~ n on the ground that a foreign administrator could not bring this_acti~n i~ the
Virginia Court. This motion was not passed ~n until Sept.l,l958, ~t.whlch t1me 1t
was sustained and the action dismissed. On ~~-1,1958, Green qual1f1ed before the
proper -court in the City of Richmond as ancillary administrator of Smith and he and
Jones immediately instituted an action in the proper court of the City of Richmond
against Kyle for ~~25,000 damages for the wrongful death of Smith. Kyle, ~Y his
attorney, filed a motion for summary ~udgment on the ground t~at the act1on had not
been brought wi:thin the statutory per1od from the death of Sm1 th.
;J ~- ~
How should the court rule on this motion?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The two year change (from one year) did not go into effect
until July 1, 1958. Hence the action was barred on July 29, . 1957. Note: If we
j t this case into the future by two years then the motlon for summary judgment
;~~u~~ be over-ruled as V#B - 634 as amended in 1958 reads in part, "---but if any
t'on is brought within such period of two years after such person's death,
h
=~~ f~~ ~ny cause abates or is dismi~sed without determining the merits of such
t·
the time such action is pend1ng shall not be counted as any part of such
ac ~odn, 0 f two years and another suit may be brought within the remaining period
perlo
·
· t 1· t ut ed • "
of
such two years as' if such former su1t
had no t b een 1ns

7. Harry Webb J.?s c~nlicted in tHe dbUbt# d~~~t of Henry Co~nty on April 23, 1959,
for reckless driving. Twenty-four days ther~atter, on May 17,1959, Webb was again
apprehended and charged with reckless driving. The warrant for this last offense
charged that the a.c cused did "unlawfully operate a motor vehicle on the public road
in a reckless manner. tt
During the course of the trial, the Commonwealth attempted to introduce evidence
of the previous uo.n viction of April 23, 1959. Counsel for Webb innnediately objected
on the ground that evidence of a prior conviction is inadmissible since the warrant
on which Webb was being tried did not charge that Webb was being tried for a second
offense. How should the Court rule on this objection?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Objection sustained. A man cannot be tried for a higher
crime or a different crime from that with which he is charged. To allow such a
practice is grossly unfair and would violate the constitutional requirement of due
process. See 200 Va.341 on p.587 of the Pleading and Practice Section of taese notec
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9. The action of Plaintiff v. Defendant was tried in the Circuit Court of wythe

County on July 7,1959, on which date the jury brought in a verdict for Defendant.
Immediately upon the return of the verdict Plaintiff's counsel moved to set it
aside, the Judge took time to consider the motion, and, on July 31, overruled it
and on that day judgment was entered that Plaintiff take nothing and that Defendant
recover his costs from Plaintiff. Plaintiff then asked, and got, a ninety -day
suspension of execution in order that he might apply to the Supreme Court of
Appeals for a writ of error.
(1) From what date must be computed the time within which the petition for a writ
of error must be filed?
(2) On the trial there was granted to Defendant, over Plaintiff's objection, an
ins truction, initialed by the trial judge. What, if anything, need bn done to make
this instruction a part of the record?
(3) The evidence was transcribed. What, if anything, must Plaintiff do to have
this transcript made a part of the record?
(4) After re-reading the transcript of the testimony, Plaintiff's counsel, for
the f i rst time concluded that certain evidence, prejudicial to his case, but to
which no objecti on was made in the trial, was clearly inadmissible. This had not
been menti oned in the notice of appeal and assignment of error.
Will this question be considered by the Supreme Court of Appeals?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) (1) By V#8-463 the· time runs from the date when a final
as distinguished from an interlocutory judgment was rendered, i.e. July 3lst.Note
it is not from the date that the judgment became final 21 days later. Of course i f
the original judgment is changed within the 21 days the time would run from the
entry of the changed judgment.
(2) Nothing more is required in this case. See Rule 5:1(3)(b).

480.
(3) If both counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant sign the transcript, and it is su·)mi t t ed to the judge within 60 days of final judgment and signed by him withi n 70
days after the final judgment, it becomes part of the record when delivered to th?

clerk. Rule 5:2(e). If counsel for opposing party refuses to sign, the proced~e 1 n
Rule 5:2(f) must be followed. This procedure is essentially the same as that JUSt
set f orth above except that counsel tendering the transcript must give reas~nab~e
wri t t en notice to the other party's counsel of the time and place of tender 1 ng ~t
and a r easonable opportunity to examine it.
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7. On ~une 15,1960, Donald Lucas went to the used car lot of Roanoke Cars,Inc., to
look at the several vehicles offered for sale. While there, Lucas fell ~nto conversation with Ben Harris, the Sales Manager of the Company, and inquired about a crimson
colored Plymouth with a retractable top. On inspecting the vehicle, Lucas noticed
that the speedometer indicated a total mileage of 19,000 miles and asked Harris
whether that was correct. To this Harris replied: "It most certainly is. We never do
anything to deceive a customer11 • Thereupon, Lucas bought and paid cash for the
Plymouth at its listed price of $2,100 and received in return all necessary title
papers, properly executed. On June 20th, Lucas learned that Roanoke Cars, Inc., had
purchased the Plymouth from George Vest on June 12th, that, at the time of the sale
by Vest, the vehicle had been driven 69,000 miles with that mileage shown on the
speedometer, but that Roanoke Cars, Inc., had changed the speedometer reading. Lucas
now asks you to inform him of what remedies at law or in equity he may have against
Roanoke 6ars,Inc., and, if successful, the relief to which he will be entitled in
each instance. What should you advise him?
(PLEADING-•Torts--Sales--Equity)(l) Lucas may sue for the tort of deceit in which he
could clearly recover the difference in value of the c*r as it is and $2100. (In
some jurisdictions he could recover even in tort the difference of the value of the
car as it actually was at the time of the sale and as it would have been if as
warranted.) Since the deceit was intentional a jury could also award him punitive
damages.(2)Lucas could sue for damages for breach of an express warranty recovering
a judgment for the difference between the actual value of the car and the value of
the car i f it had been as warrant,ed. (3) Lucas could rescind in equity. He is entitled
to return the car and get the $2100 back.

8.~n GAFril 3, 1960, an action was tried in the Circuit Court of Goochland County
wherein John Farragut sought to recover $15,000 from William Worth as damages for
personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident. On the same d y the jury
brought in a verdict for Worth and judgment was entered accordingly~ on June 24
1960, Farragut for the first time learned that during the course of the trial '
Worth's principal witness had secretly discussed the merits of the case with two of
the jurors. He now seeks your advice on whether he may have the judgment set aside
and a new trial ordered. What should you advise him?
(PLEADING) I would advise him it was too late to do anything. The judgment became
final 21 days after its entry under Rule 3:21. The alleged misconduct in this case
is not so venal or corrupt as to justify the intervention of equity.

9. ~G~bruary 2, 1957, a collisi on occurred in the City of Richmond between two
motor vehicles, one driven by John Willis and the other by Russell Ford. Because
of the collision, Willis suffered personal injuries and his automobile was badly
damaged. AS spectators gathered around the scene of the accident, Ford, who was a
creditor of Willis, walked up to him and said: "You dirty dog, this serves you
right. As a man who has cheated me out ~f my m~ney, you ~eserve nothing be~ter."
On June 15 1960, Willis brought an act1on aga1nst jord 1n the Law and Equ1ty Court
of the cat; of Richmond. Willis• motion for judgment contained three counts; one
seeking $10,000 for personal injuries, one seeking $1,112.50 for damage to his
automobile , and one seeking $5 1 000 for the slanderous remarks of Ford. Ford now
consults you and, although admitting the collision was entirely his fault and
f urther admitting that his statements to Willis were untrue, asks your advice on
~Tha t defenses, if any, he might make to each count of the motion for jud[ljment. What
sho uld you advise him?
(PLEADING) I would advise him that he has a defense as to both the personal injury
and t he slanderous remarks because of the statute of limitations which is now two
yeari in personal injury actions and probably one year in defamation actions.
Since the five year statute has not yet run on the property injury action he i s
l iable for the damages done to plaintiffs car.

Tt;o

/

10. Assume the following facta:
At ~:20p.m. on January 2,1960, while John Minter was riding as a guest passenger
in an automobile driven by Alfred Moncure, the automobile collided with another
vehicle driven by Herbert Potts. The collision occurred in clear weather· and on a
straight stretch of U.S.Route 360 in Amelia County just west of Amelia Court House
where both Moncure and Potts resided. The collision was virtually head-on, both
automobiles were then traveling over the center line of the highway. As a result of
the accident, Minter suffered a broken back and severe lacerations. He was hospitalized for three months and incurred medical expenses of $5,243. He has been unable
to work since the accident, and his physician considers that he is permanently disabled and will at no future time be able to engage in a gainful occupation. At the
time of his injuries, Minter was regularly employed at an annual salary of $10,000.
He is now 44 years of age and has a provable life expectancy of au years.
Draw the appropriate pleading on behalf of Minter by which recovery is · sought
against both Moncure and Potts.
(PLEADING) See Burks Pleading and Practice(4th Ed) Paragraph 182 and note 22 thereto
The proper pleading would be a mntion for judgment substantially as follows:
COMMONWEALTH · OF VIRGINIA
In the Circuit Court for the County of Amelia
John Minter, Plaintiff
)
v.

)

Alfred Moncure and Herbert Potts )
)
(Addresses), Defendants
Motion for Judgment
1. On or about 2:20p.m. of January 2, 1960, the plaintiff, John Minster, was
riding as a guest passenger in an automobile owned and driven by the defendant,
Alfred Moncure, in a westerly direction on a highway known as Route 360 in Amelia
County just west of Amelia Court House.
2. The defendant, Alfred Moncure drove the said car so recklessly, wantonly,
and !n sucij a grossly negligent manner that he collided head on with the car driven
in the opposite direction by the defendant, Herbert Potts, both cars peing over the
center of the road at the time of the collision despite the fact that the day was
clear and the road straight.
3. Neither defendant was keeping an adequate lookout and the gross negligence
of the defendant, Moncure, and the negligence of the defendant Potts, proximately
resulted in serious and grievous injuries to the plaintiff as follows:
4.(a)Medical expenses of $5,243;(b)permanent and total incapacity for renumerative work of any kind to plaintiff's damage of $200,000;(c)untold physical
and mental pain,suffering, and anguish to the extent of $50,000;
.
Wherefore, the plaintiff moves this Honorable Court for judgment against the
defendant, Alfred Moncure, or against the defendant Herbert Potts, or against both,
in the amount of $275,000 besides the cost of this action.
John Minter
By Counsel
(Signed)Jefferson Blackstone, Box 443, Williamsburg,Virginia, June 27, 1960.

•
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1 • Langley purchased a washing machine from Field for $120, ard executed and delivered to Field his installment note for the purchase price. The note called for
payments in twelve equal installments, the installments to be paid on the 1st day of
successive months, to include interest at 6%, and in the event of default in the
P§yment of any installment the whole debt would then become due and payable. After
paying two installments, Langley missed a payment, and when another month went by
without payment, Field obtained a judgment for the two past-due installments.
Langley thereupon satisfied. the judgment, and no further paymenta were made. At the
end of the year Field sued Langley to recover the talance of the note. Langley consults you. What defense, it any, is available to him?
(PLEADHD AND PRACTICE ) Langley has t he detense of res adjudicata. The whole swn
was automatically due when default took place. No man should be twice vexed for one
and the same thing. Th~ one cause of action cannot be split into two or more actions .See 168 Va.284, 191 S.E.608 on p.2200 of the Negotiable Instruments cases in these
notes.

•

6~~~rbert Mundy, Executor of the will of the deceased Stuart Chapman, duly brought
a suit in the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond seeking advice and guidance in
the administration of the estate. Mundy's bill raised numerous issues, one of which
was whether a trust of Blackacre recited in paragraph 11 of the will violated the
rule against perpetuities. After hearing evidence ore tenus, the Court entered an
interlocutory order which found that the trust recited ~n paragraph 11 did violate
the rule against perpetuities and that Blackacre passed by intestacy, and which referred to a commissioner in chancery all other matters raised by the bill with the
direction tl1at the commissioner hear additional evidence on such matters and report
back to the Court his findings. John Hash, one of the defendants in the suit but no
relation of Stuart Chapman, is the principal beneficiary of the trust as recited in
paragraph 11 of ·the will. He asks you whether he may seek an appeal from the interlocutory order, or whether he must await the entry of the final decree. What should
you advise him?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) I would advise that he can seek an appeal at once. While
the general rule is that an appeal lies only to final decrees there are a number of
statutory exceptions one of which is that an interlocutory decree which adjudicates
the principles of a cause is appealable. Code #8-462(2)(c).

•

6 {)
.
8.bHarvey Bones sued Jake Hide to recover $25,000. In count one of the motion for
judgment plaintiff sought to recover $20,000 damages for personal injuries alleged
to have been sustained by plaintiff as a result of the defendant's negligent
operation of his automobile. In count two of the motion for judgment plaintiff
sought to recover $5,000, the purchase price due under a written contract between
the parties relating to the sale of .a valuable horse. The defendant demurred to the
motion for judgment and also filed a counterclaim to recover damages for a trespass
to his real property alleged to have been committed by the plaintiff. Plaintiff demurred to the count~claim.(a)Is the motion for judgment demurrable?(b) Is the
counterclaim demurrable?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) (a) A~ demurrer lies to the motion for judgment as a count
in contract cannot be joined with one in tort at least where the two counts arise out of independent transactions. 94 Va.775, (b) The counterclaim is not demurrable.
Rule 3:8 permits counterclaims whether or not they are in contract or in tort,
whether or not they are liquidated, and whether or not theyArise from any transaction mentioned in the motion for judgment.
~l
.
9.,J 1'he Circuit Court of Arlingt,on County, Va., entered a final judgment in an action

•

at law against Shepard on the 1st day of Feb.l961. Shepard promptly directed his
attorney to take the necessary steps to perfect an appeal. Whereupon counsel for
Shepard, within the time prescribed by law, obtained a certification of the testimony
and other incidents of the, trial by the trial judge and filed his notice of appeal
and assignments of error. On the 15th day of May,l961, counsel for Shepard filed
with the clerk of the circuit court a designation of the parts of the record that he
wished printed and, pursuant to direction of Shepard's counsel, the clerk transmitted
the record to one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals on the 29th day of
May,l961. A writ of error was granted upon a Petition presented to the same Justice
of the Court on the 30th day of May,l961. At the time the case came on for argument
counsel for defendant in error moved to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that the'
writ of error had been improvidently awarded. How should the Court rule?
(PLEADING AND' PRACTICE) The motion to di~miss should.be g:anted. Section 6(a) of
Rule 5:1 provides that counsel for appellant shall f~le w~th the clerk of the Court
from which an ap~al is talcen, not less than 20 days before the record is transmitted
a designation of the parts of the record that he wishes printed. This is mandatory '
nd involves the exercise of dlscretion rather than being a purely ministe :cial act.
CNote that by May 15th it is too late to provide for the 20 days as the overall four
months period runs out orl June 1st.) See 192 Va.329 in the Cases on Pleading and
Practice in these notes.

6.~Lssenger was injured when a taxicab owned and operated by Cabbie and in which
Passenger was being transported, collided with an automobile owned and operated by
Brown at a street intersection in Radford,Va. Passenger instituted an action by
1notion for judgment against Cabbie in the Corporation Court of Radford, seeking
damages for his injuries. Upon service of process, Cabbie immediately moved the
Court to enter its order requiring Passenger to amend his motion for judgment to
bring Brown in as a defendant, on the ground that there was a non-joinder of parties.
In support of his motion Cabbie filed an affidavit stating that Brown was subject to
the jurisdiction of the Court and that Brown was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the accident. How should the Court rule on Cabbie's motioni
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Cabbie's motion should be denied. Tort liabilitl here is
joint and several and plaintiff can sue one or both at his option. Rule 3:9.1 abolish•
es third party practice in actions at law.
7Jl6arpenter, a building contractor, instituted an action by motion for judgment
against Hanson, alleging that Carpenter had contracted to construct a home for
Hanson, that the construction had been completed in accordance with the contract,
but that Hanson had refused to pay for the same. Upon being served with process in
this action, Hanson immediately filed his counterclaim against Carpenter in which
Hanson alleged that the construction had been performed in such an unworkmanlike
manner that Hanson was compelled to expend large sums of money in order to make the
house habitable, for which he soug~t judgment against Carpenter.
On the morning of the trial, before the jury was impaneled, Carpenter moved the
Court for a continuance of the action on the ground that several witnesses on whom
he relied, but who were not subpoenaed, were unable to be present. The Court over·~u~ the motion. The trial proceeded, and after both parties had rested and the
jury had been instructed and the attorneys had concluded their arguments to the jury,
Carpenter's attorney sensed from the expressions of the jurors that his case had
fared poorly because of Carpenter's lack of expert witnesses, and as the jury was
preparing to retire to consider its verdict, Carpenter's attorney moved the Court
to be permitted to suffer a non-suit, which motion Hanson's attorney opposed.
How should the Court rule on Carpenter's motion for a non-suit?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)Dy V#8-244 a non-suit cannot be taken where defendant 'has
filed a counterclaim as defendant should then have the right that the whole matter
(including his counterclaim)be determined. The last sentence reads, 11 In such caae
the plaintiff shall not, after the counterclaim is filed, dismiss his case without
the defendant's oonsent. 11

lol:>~nider, a widowe:c, died lea\•ing a vrill which named his sL-;: sons as beneficiaries,
and leaYing a large estat@) compo,3ed of a vari ety of asnets. The six sons disagree<i
among thC"..mselves al'l to the me.-:l.ning of t he \vill 9 so that each t ook exception to the
executor's proposed distribution. The executor inetltuted a suit to construe the
wil~ in the proper court, and in which suit he soug!!.t tho cour)ljas guidance in the
adm~nistration of the est.f;\te. 'fhe six sons we;:-e d~fendants in the cause. The cause
matured ard wa~ referred to a special <;omrnission8r who was directed to take evidence
and to report t~ the court.
After the repw~ of th e sr~ cial commiGsioner was ~iled and exceptions thereto were
taken by't;everal oR the part~es , the court entered ~ ts de~reG construing the will
and decreeing the dis tribution of the es tate to the beneficiaries . The day afte!' this
deer~ was entered, one Ha,rpie seeks your adv.i.ce and tells you that just before the
decree was enter ed~ he took an ass:i gnrnent of the interost :i_n the estate of one of the
distributee sonc, as securi ty f or a debt O'rl'ed him by that son. He wants to assert
hia assignment against the sonls dintributive share i n the estat0, but the executor
hal'.l refused to honor Harpie 1 s clairr1o In what manner, if any, can Harpie assert his
right in the suit?
(Pl£ADING AND PRACTICE ) SinGe the de~ree is nr t yet final and Harpie now has a substantia.JJ interest in the caoe te should petition 'to intervene . See Rule 2:15, "A
new; party may by pot.ition filed by l eave o.f court assert any claim or defense germane
to ~he subject matter of the sui t. 11

•
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filed a suit in equity in the Circuit Court of Lee County,Va., against
Granite, seeking specific performance of a written contract for the sale of a tract
of land known as "Tombstone." Granite filed an answer in which he did not admit . the
existence of the written contract, called for proof thereof, and denied that plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought. The answer did not set out the reasons for
which relief should be denied. The trial court heard evidence ore tenus at which time
plaintiff proved the written contract. The court permitted the-aefendant to prove
over the objection of counsel for the plaintiff, that he had not seen the propert;
before the contract was signed; that before the contract was signed he had been
advised by his friend, Slab, that the .property was improved by a newly constructed
brick residence, and that the property fronted on a hard-surfaced state highway;
that after the contract had been signed he examined the property and found that his
friend had been mistaken about the property he was seeking to purchase, and that the
property described in the contract was not improved by a modern brick dwelling nor
did it front on a hard-surfaced state highway and, because the property he was
purchasing was not as represented by his friend, that it had a value of a least
$20,000 less than the agreed purchase price . The record consisted of the pleadings
the written contract which had been filed as an exhibit, and the decree of the cou~t.
After hearing argument of counsel the court entered a decree containing the following language:
"This cause came on to be heard upon the appearance of the parties, in person
and by counsel, upon evidence heard ore tenus, and upon due consideration
whereof the court doth adjudge, order-ana-aecree that plaintiff is not
entitled to specific performance of the \>II'itten contract filed as an exhibit with the bill of complaint in this cause. And this suit is dismissed
at the cost of the plaintiff, and the clerk is directed to place it among
causes ended."
Three months after the date of the entry of said decree Marble consulted his
lawyer and advised that he desired that some action be taken in an attempt to obtain
the relief sought in his bill of complaint. Ten dave a.fter thi,. , .. d . ,.,.......,fArence with
. t counsel for plaintiff filed a b~ll of review charging that there was
· h i5· c 1 1.en
""'-i tted para 1 ev1· d ence t o
on· ' the face of the record in that the court had aw•1
e'~'"ror up
t
·
tha t. .the court
v.; 1. and contradict the terms of the written contrac , and pra·~ng
yl the decree entered by the court and enter a decree grant1.ng spec1.f1c performa.llnu r~ Marble entitled to the relief sought by the bill of review?
~~~I~G AND PRACTICE) No. There is no error of law apparent on the ~ace of the .
\
d N steps were taken to incorporate the evidence heard orally 1.nto the record.
recor
• oChancellor's decision could have been based on that ev1'dence, and no sue h
Since the
'd
1.'a in the record there is no error of law apparent on the face of the
ev:J. ence
'
d Note· Under V#B-613
a bill of review may be f1. 1 ed 1 n a proper case Wl.· thi n
r~cor ·ths nex.t after a final decree has been entered. Note that the 21 days limitaSl.X man
·
.
i R le 2•22 with reference to the final1ty
of decrees i s no t applicabl e as a
tJ.on 11 u
•
bill of review only lies for a review of a final decree •

6.0 ~km

Srni th asks yct'.r advice on the following questions:
(1) How is an action at law commenced in Virginia?
(a) If the defendant wishes to challenge the v anue, how and when must this be
done?
(3) If the defende.nt does mt thj nk that a cau.sc of action has · been . stated
against him, how and when mr:.y t.he qt'.estion be r~.iscd?
·- ·
(4) If the defendant ·beL.eves the plaintiff owes him money because of a matter
not arising out of the t:ran.:>C1c ·;;ion sued upon, may he assert this claim in the pending suit?
How ought y·ou to answer ea.ch of these c;_uestions?
8., (PLEADING AND PRA.CTICE) (1) Bv filing in the cle:r·k' s offi~P. a mo·tion for judgment
and by payin;5 the rcq•1ired w:d t tax and de pod t. agai:nct, cos-::,,s. Rule 3:3 (a).
(2) By a plea in abatement filed before or si..l!lcltanec·usly <:ith(but not after) a
demurrer, plea in bar, or . plc~a tc the merits wi7;,h~.!l 21 days af'i:.er service of the
notice of motion for jt'.dgmenij on the def~ndant. Hule 3 ~ 6.
(3.) By a demurrer filE<d before the ecpi:r.ation of 21 days llftf)r service of the notice
of motion for j~tdgment on the def"-':nr.'.ant o. R.u.le J t 5; 01.' in &u~ne cases by a motion for
summar~r judgment as par Rule 3:20.
(4) Yes, by Rule 3:8.

7 ,l>~r.ucker was operating a tractor-trailer eastwardly on Main St., follolv-ed by
Hiddleton operating a Bu~.ck, ~:ho, in turn, was followed by Motox-ist driving a Ford
automobile. Trucker stopped and Middleton ran into the trailer and Motorist ran
into Middleton's B11icko Both Motorist and fliddlcton received personal injuries and
their cards were damaged.
Motorist has sued both Middleton a~1d T:u•~kf:::ll.' fc:r: his darr..3.ges, alleging negligence
on the part of each of them. Middle~o::-1 c:or.sclto you as tv -whether tn this action
he can (a)file a claim against Hotoriot for hi::: tam~g~; s~ c:>.ni(b) file a claim
against Trucker for the same daw2.ge8. lhnr Ol!ght. you to advise him?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(a) Yec, "-.S a ccuntel'(.laim under Rule 3:8 (b) Yes, as a cross·
claim under Rule 3:9 vrhich read~ in pa:'t, "A defendant may, at his option, plead as
a cross-claim any cause of action tbat h3 has against on3 or more other defendants
growing out of any matter pleaded in ths notice of motion for judgment."

1
8))bantor was indicted n:1d

t:-~ieu

in the Circuit Court of Wythe County for murder,
found guilty and sentenc.ed to confinement in the peni t.entia:!'y. He was defended by
Mr. B., a youthful practitioner. A month lat3r Cabtor' s father employs you to see
if you can find any ground upcP- whil;h the convietion me.y now be contested successfully. Upon ex~ning into the matter you find the foll~wing:
(1) The writ of venire facif'.s commanded the sheriff to summon eighteen persone
instead of twenty as requirGd by statu.te.
(2) The killing actua l ly occur r ed abo ut a mile over t he ~ ~J\.mty line in Gray~on
County.
-'
542 .,
i . ~ ·. . -~·;. ·.
~' A::. the trial ths court instructed the jury that if they believed by a preponder·~
anc e of the evidence that th~ defendant was guilty then they should find a verdict
oi' guilty.
4) 1'!-lat the defendant was not p'res~nt in the courtroom when the jury returned its ver
d ~ ~t and was discharged, although he was in the custody of the sherif~ at.the time.
How 011ght you to advise on each ot these points, assuming that no obJeCtlon was made
3. G to any of them at the time of the trial?
(PLEADI NG AND PRACTICE) (l)and(3) By Rule1:8 "All objections to writs of every ki nd
~~ * * (a nd) instructions
-:~
shall state with r easonable cartainty the grouud of obj ection,and, unless it app ears from the record to have been so stated, such objectio?s will not be considered by this court except for good cause shown, o~ to en~ble
th1s court to attain the ends of jus ·t.ice". It is arguable t hat the error 1n the lnst.ruction is so great t hat the exception stated above is applicable. (2) By Rule 1:8
objections to venue must be made before verdict.(4) In felony cases the accused mast
be present at every stage of the trial. Hl:l cannot waive this right. Since the time
for an appe al has not gone by an appeal lies. Since defendant is being held illegally
htJ i s en·t,itlel:l ''en ~ ari t nf habea's corpus •

•

* *

•
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6.' ~o secure a valid personal judgment, on whom should process be served in the
following actions at law in Virginia:
(a) A resident plaintiff against a nonresident operator of an automobile for
personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident occurring in Virginia, the
nonresident not being in Virginia at the time of instituting the action?
(b) An action for libel against John Smith, a resident of Roanoke, aged twenty
years?
(PLEADING and PRACTICE)(a) By V#B-67.1 process should be served on the Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles. (b) Process(to be absolutely sure) should be served on the infant
and his guardian ad li tern where a personal judgment or decree is desired. 11 But in
order that the infant may thus become * * * a party to the suit, and bound by the
proceedings, it is essential that the guardian ad litem enter his appearance by
answer or otherwise." V#8-88 implies that where a guardian ad 11 tem is regularly
page 557 o
appointed, there need be no service of process on the infant, but t h::;re is some do,J.I:ri:
as to whether or not the statute i~:; constitutional as against an infant's contenti')X~
that it lacks due process to hold him personally when he has not been served. See
BUl~ks 1 (3d Ed o) pp.68-70, and Lile's Equity Pleading ar~ Practice (2d Ed.)##59
through 68.

f "?-1· A motion for judgment, after proper formal allegations as to parties and juris-

diction, contained a numbered paragraph reading:
!liThe plaintiff moves the court for judgment against the defendant ~ . n th3
st~:.n of 'J\ m Thousand Dollars because the defendant negligently operated his
automohile thereby striking the plaintiff and causing him serious bodily
injury ~ " No other allegations were contained in the moti.on for judgment.
The defendant demurred to this pleading, assigning e.n ~rou:1ds therefor t.ha·\i
i t did not set out the particulars , (a)of the negligence, nor(b) of the injurj_ ee~
The defendant e.lso filed a plea stating t.h:'. t: 11 The supposed cause of action iF.:
barred by the statute of limitations." The plaintiff moved the court. to strike this
plea because it did not specify the particular stetute relied on. How should the
court rule on(l)the demurrer and (2) the motion to strike?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Defendant's demurrer should be overruled. Instead of demurring in(a)he should ask for a bill of particulars. See Rule 3-18(d). By Rule J-18(i)
"An allegation that an a~tion is barred by the statute of limitations is sufficient
without specifying the particular stat,ute relied o~1.n

91 1>ia.intiff sued defendant in the Circuit Court of Green County,Va., for $1,000
damages to his automobile. On .January 10,, 1962, the case was t:::-ied and the jury retur ned this verdict: '~We, the jury, u.pon the issue joined find for the plaintiff
and asses a his damages at ~P.35o ~ u Def endant, by counsel, immediat<:lly moved to set
aside the verdict and enter final judgment in his favor or in lieu thereof moved to
set aside the verdict and award a new trial o The judge took the motions under advisement and on January 31,1962, overruled both motions, and entered final judgment
for the plaintiff.
on April 6th, defendant, by counsel, filed in the clerk 1 s of fie8 a notice of
appeal and assignment of error and on the same day, without saying anything to opposir.g ~counsel, presented to the trial judge~ transcript of the oral testimony and
other incidents of the trial; this transcr1pt was s i gned by t he judge on April 14th
and on that day filed in the clerk's office; on May lOth defendant's counsel instructed the clerk of the circui t court to transmit the record to the clerk of the
Supreme Court of Appeals forthwith. Assume you repr esent pl aintiff . Point out all
the errors i f any, in the above procedure.
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) 'i'he notice of appeal and as s i gnment of errors were not filed
wi thin 60 days of the entry of final judgment on January 31; there was no designat i on of the part of the r e ~ord to be printed; there was no r easonable written notice
to ~pposing counsel by the counsel t endering the transcript of t he oral testimony;
more than sixty days since final judgment elapsed before this t r anscript was presented to the trial judge, nor -vras i t signed by hi m wi thin the :required 70 days. See
Rule 5:1.

4~lfred Curtis, a resident of the City of Richmond, filed a motion for judgment in
the Law and Equity Court of that city seeking damages of John Clark, a publisher,
charging him with having printed in the Charlottesville Daily Gazette a libellous
article concerning Curtis. Clark resided in Charlottesville and process was serfed
on him at his place of residence. Two weeks after service on him, Clark, without
appearing specially, simultaneously filed in the Law and Equity Court a sworn plea
in abatement alleging improper venue and grounds of defense denying the allegations
of the motion for judgment. At a subsequent heaing, Curtis moved the court that it
overrule Clark's plea in abatement on the grounds(a)that Clark submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court by not appearing specially on filing the plea, and(b)
that Clark waived all right to plead in abatement by simultaneously filing his
grounds of defense. Should the court sustain the motion of Curtis on either, or
both, of these grounds?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) No. The second paragraph of Rule 3:6 reads, "A plea in abate •
ment or motion to quash process need not be filed upon a special appearance, and
may be filed by the defendant in proper person or by counsel. Such plea or motion
is not waived by the simultaneous or subsequent filing of other pleadings, whetl1er
upon special or general appearance, nor by trial on the merits.n

•
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S:Y~erbert Jones brought an action agai n&t Tom Rust in the Corporation Court of the

City of Petersburg. The motion for judgment prayed for judgment in the amount of
$5,000, and alleged that Rust was indebted to Jones in that sum as evidenced by a
promissory note made by Rust to the order of Jones on Dec.l,l961, that such note
called for payment on June 1,1962, but that payment had been refused though demanded.
Rust filed a demurrer to the motion for judgment, asserting as the grounds of demurrer: (a)that the promissory note had been paid, and (b) that the matter was res
~udicata in that a similar action had been decided adversely to Jones in the Circuit
ourt of Chesterfield County. How should the court rule on each ground?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The demurrer should be overruled. A demurrer lies only to
what is stated on the face. of the motion for judgment or other pleading. This motion
did not allege that Rust had paid the note, or that the issue had already been decided by another court. Rust's defenses should be taken advantage of by special
pleading in his Grounds of Defense and not by demurrer.

6~nkle accepted employment with American CorP,Oration at its Richmond plant and,
in contemplation of moving his family from Detroit, entered into a written contract
with Henry Grim to purchase Grim's residence in Henrico County. The contract provided
for a purchase price of $16 1 000, but did not recite the time or manner of paym£nt.
The contract was executed on June 1, 1962, and provided for settlement to be made
on December 31,1962. On November 15th, Winkle received .a telephone call from Grim
inquir·ing as . to: t he rnr.nner of ~pa.;yment of theJpui.!chase pric P. . Grim tb ldtWinkl~ that •
he CQnaidered that he was to be paid all cash at the time of settlement. Winkle replied by saying that he understood tt~t Grim was to receive only $4,000 at the time
of settlement, and was to take an installment promis sory no t e for the balance,auch
note to be secured by a deed of trust. After a bitter argument, Winkle hung up the
telephone. On November 30th, Winkle brought an acti on for declaratory judgment
again@t Qrim 8 in the Circuit Court of Henrico County, alleging a justiciable controversy between himself and Grim and requesti ng entry of a judgment declari ng that
he was obligated only to pay $4,000 to Grim on the date of settlement and give a
promissory note secured by a deed of trust for the balance. Grim has demurred to the
moti on for judgment, assigning as his ground of demurrer that there is no justiciabl.a . ·cont.roversy between. himself and Winkle, since perfonnance of the contract is
not to be made until Dec.)l,l962. How should the oourt rule on the demurrer? - .
(:PLEAD!Rl AND PRACTICE) ':l'het danurrer eho\lld be overruled. The Tery pu-pose of the
Declaratory Judgment Aot. ia to determine the rights of the partiea(in case of a
genuine controversy) in adTame. See VN8•S78. PreTentiTe relief 1a the mortng
purpose.

•

•

•

9~ i b.er Huffman, a widower and guardicm of his three children, brought sui t in the
Circuit Court of Giles County to have s old am apportioned among them the sharel ot
his children, aged 10,12 and 16 years, i.~ a tract of land on Sinking Creek Mountain
in Giles County, which land Huffman had previously conveyed to them. The Bill in
ChanCery was not verified. Process was e>.:ecuted on the three c hildren by the
Sberift of Craig County, who made personal serv~ce on each of them at their home in
that Count;y. A guardian~ 11tem was appointed tor the children, who, together with
the children, filed UMWOrn answers to the Bill. Thereafter, clepoaitiona were taken
JW'8Uant to notice in the office of Huff'man • s lawyer w1th only 'lihe lawyer, Huffman
and hie three children present.
Tbe record, ebold.ng only the foregoing procedural steps, has bean presented. to
you as Judge ot the Circuit Court ot GUee CO<'. nty. Recite the procedural error s,
11' any.

(p:-:JW)Itll AND PRACTICE) Procedural errors are e.s tollowaa
1. The Bill in Chancery should have been verified by the oadtb

W~-~1~ -

ot the plaint:Ut.
~IJ •

2. The guardian ad l i tern and the infant over 14 years of age should have answered
the bil l on oath in proper person. V#8·679.
). The evidence should have been taken in the presence of the guardian ad litem.
Liles Equity Pleading and ~~ctic e (Meade) #410 •

. IP>'

•

10J, on July 7,1960, in the Circui t Court of Fairfax County, Ruby Overfelt was award(~d a verdi ct of $10,000 a gainst Beulah Armbrister. Immediately thereafter the defendant,, by counsel, moved to set asi de the verdict as contrary to the law and the
evidence. On October 20,1960, the Judge heard arguments on the motion and proceeded
to render hi s decision, holding that the verdict of the jury be sustained. He ad"
vised each counsel to submit an order giving judgment in accordance with the verdict,
and an November 4,1960, he received the draft of each order submitted by counsel.
Not being satisfied with either draft the Judge resolved the differences, drew his
own order, antedated the same to October 20,1960, endorsed it and delivered the
original to the Clerk with copies to counsel . The transcript of evidence endorsed by
both counsel was forwarded by counsel for the defendant to the Judge at Fairfax,
and on December 26,1960 it was received by t he Judge who signed it, and on the same
day delivered it to t he Clerk of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County.
was the transcript of the evidence properly made a part of the r ecord for purposes
of an appeal to the Supr~e Court of Appeals of Virginia?
(PI.JYU)ING AND PRACTICE) Yes. The &J day pe r i od for submission of the transcript of
t he evidence cannot be cut down by a reprospecti ve nunc ~ ~ order. The judgment
was entered on November 4 even if rendered on Octo b~O. The period runs from the
entry-not the rendi tion. See 193 Va.390 on p .565A of the Pleading and Practice
Cases in these notes.

l~~n

May of 1963 Davi d St reet entered into a written contrac t by the terms of
1•hich he agr eed to sell to Robert Fores t a r esidence owned by him i n the City of
Danville . The residenc e was one in a '' r ow" of houses , each being quite s i mi l a:· t o
the others and the ma jor ity being for sale at t he same price f or which Street had
ag:reed to sell t o Forest. Short ly therea f t er Fore s t informed Str eet that he :.:•0!'use
to make the purchase . Thereupon St reet brought a suit fo r spec ific perfonnan~ 8 e.gains t Forest i n the Co:L"poration Court of the City of Danville . Af t er Forest l:ad
filed his answer denying liabilit y, the c ourt heard evi dence ore t enus and ente:::- 8 d
an order fi nding that Street had an adequate r emedy at l aw a nd dir ec t ing the tra:u:d
of the case f rom the equity s i de to t he l aw s i de of the court f or the impanel"~:iJ.. of
a jury to assess damages . No decis ion has ye t been made on the quest i on of da1,1.•. : ~ .,1 ::· :
Stree t , much upset by t he action of t he cour t , inquires of you whether he may, T !;
t hi s stage of the proc eeding, undertake an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appoa~' [; ..
lr{nat shoul d your a.dvice be?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE ) I would advise that he coul d . While ordinarily only fino.l
decr ees and judgments may be appeal ed, interlocutory order s or decr ees of a cour· ~
of' equity which adjudicate the principles of a cause are appealable . See V#B-462.

,-r,,);,
5-/-'rn an action at latv pending in the Circuit Court of Augusta County, Va., EoZ.
Hopalong sought to recover d~ages from Hank Salmon for an alleged breach of warrant~
After the parties were at is$.u.e plaintiff s~rved upon defendant a written notice
that he would take the deposition of William Stout, a resident of Augusta County, at
a fixed time and place. Stout was actively engaged in business in Augusta County
and had knowledge of facts material to the issues in the case. Upon receiving ths
notice counsel for defendant ·~nquired of counsel for plaintiff his purpose in taking
the deposition and he was adv:i~sed that his lntention was to commit Stout to answers
under oath so that he could use the deposition for corss-examining him at the time
of trial. Counsel for defendant strongly desires to prevent the taking of the
deposition.
(1) By what procedure may counsel for defendant object to the taking of depositon?
(2) Does defendant have grounds upon which to successfully oppose the taking of
the deposition?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(l) Rule 3:23(a) reads, "A party may object to the taking of
a deposition de bene esse by moving the court, promptly aft.er receiving notice of
the taking of the deposition, to quash the notice unJ.ess satisfied that the taking
of the deposition is in good faith for the purpose of taking and introducing the
testimony of a witness who may not be able to attend the trial of the case." (2)
Yes, since plaintiff does not wish to take the deposition for the purpose of introducing it as the testimony of a witness who may not be able to attend the trial of
the case as required by Rule 3:23(a).

6f 0ladys Honeywell sued West Lake Hospita~,Inc.,
0

a non-charitable corporation, in
the Circuit Court of Brunswick County, Va., to recover damages for personal injuries
alleged to have been sustained by her while she was upon the hospital premises
visiting her mother, a patient in the hospital. In her motion for judgment plaintiff
charged that the defendant was negligent in the following particulars:
11 1. The maintenance of a step in the hospital in a defective and dangerous
condition;
11
2. Failure to keep the steps properly lighted; and
"3. Failure to have hand rails on the steps which could be used by the plaintiff
when descending the stairs."
Defendant filed the follov1ing responsive pleading:
"Defendant assigns the following grounds of defense:
11
1. Defendant denies it mai ntained a step in the hospital in a defective and
dangerous condition)
11
2. Defendant denies that it failed to keep the steps properly lighted;
11
3. Defendant denies that it failed to have ha.nd rails on the steps which could
be used by the plaintiff when descending the stairs."
During the trial of the case plaintiff offered evidence to prove the averments
contained in her motion for judgment and rested. Defendant then offered to prove by
the superintendent of the hospital that plai ntiff, while walking down the steps
with very high heels, was talking to a companion, that she did not look where she
\>Jas going, and that her ankle gave way because she stepped too close to the edge
of the steps thus causing her to fall. Counsel for plaintiff objected to the introduction of this evidence.
Is the evidence admissible?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) No. Defendant is attempting to pro'Te that Plaintiff was
contributorily negligent. In order to do this he must affirmatively allege contributory negligence in his responsive pll:eading or rely on contributory negligence
shown by plaintiff's own evidence. Rule 3:18(h).

-·
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?n the ~vem.:.ng ?f Hay 1~ 1963, Frank Cox visited John vJater.s in his spacious
res1.den~e 1.n the C1.ty of Rl.Chmond, such r8sidEmce having a fair market value of
$95,000. Waters was an elderly bach3loro During the visit Cox falsely informed
Waters that he was th'3 son of Hiram Cox, a wealthy old college classmate of waters
whom Waters had not seen fer many years, In fact, Frank Cox was not the son of
Hira~ Cox but was a person of bad :,.·eputat:Lon and o.f no finanoial worth. Waters
rely~ng ~n the statement of Cox, ~~reed to sell him the residence for $50,000 ~d to
r~ce1ve 1n exchange thsrefor Cox ' s unsecured p:romis::oi'y not 8 in like amount payal:lle
s1.x months after date. On May J:~d Waters executed anJ deliverl.'ld to Cox a deed COi.1•·
v~ying to him the residence, and r eceived .frorn Cox thalatter's promissory note .f.nr
$50,000. Shortly thereafter Cox duly recorded the deer:!. o ~!a ters, having now learr.P-d
the true facts, has brought a suit against Cox in the Law and Equity Court of the
City of Richmond seeking. a re.sciss~.?n of the. t-ra~sactio.n. He expresses to you hi f.:
fear that, before. the su1 t can be f:;_n~lly de ·Ge ~·mJ.ned, Cox may convey the property
to some unsuspoot1.ng person a~1d thus aeL'lat the rights of vv'-<ters.
Waters asks what he might. qnickly do to pres'3rve those rights. What should you
advise him?
9 '")

I" · . ,

( FL.:'..ADING AND PRACTICE) r should advise him to file a notice of lis pendens in ··~;l~

PY' O:f.Je~ c"L,rk' s office as per the provisions of V#8-lh2, and see that it is incl.e·;c3d

:~ts . quJ.ckly aa pn s si..bl e, .for it is .not de emed t o have "be ::m recorded unless anr.l unU. !

"Lr'.doxed as required

b;r J

!'"llJ .
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3.-:f&'-1
f\ motion for judgment alleged that Defendant neghgent y operat9d his automobile

•

and thereby struck Plaintiff and 0aused him scYere personal J.nJuries. Defendant,
rTithin the permitted time, filed a paper setting out, t.mder appropriate headings,
the following:
(1) A demurrer because tha particulars of the negligsnce were net statad.
(2) A motion for a bill of particulars of the injures sustained.
(3) A cc,unterclaim agatnst Plaintiff for 4t2,500, balance due on a note •
(4) That the action was barred. by a statute of limitations.
(5) That he denied the charge of negligence.
Plaintiff objeeted to the paper and moved to strike it out on the grounds:
(a) That it was multifarious;
(b) That Defendsnt was not entitlod to know the particulars of the injuries;
(c) 'rhat it was not nf;Cessa:t y to set out the par·l;j_culars of the negligence;
(dO That the countercJ.aim could not be asserted in the pending action; and
(e) That the paper did not specify the particular statute of limitations relied on
How ought the Court to rule on ea~h ground?
(PJ~DING AND PHACTICE)(a) The objection of multifariousnes s is not valid. Rule
3:18(j) reads, ''Grounds of defE:nse, counterC~laims, cross claims, pleas) demurrers,
affirmative defenses and motions may all be included in the same paper if they are
separately identified. 11
(b) This objection is invalid. Rule 3:18(d) expressly pr ovides for bills of
particulars in proper cases of which this is one. .
.
(c) While it is not necessar;y- to set out the part:J..culars of the neghgence in the
motion for judgment, it is necessary in the blll of particulars if one is properly
ordered and this is reasonably possi ble.
(d) Counterclaims are alloll:ed by aule 3:8, so this objection is untenable.
(e) By Rule 3:18(i) an allega tion t~at an actiol_l is barred by the_ statute of 1~
tations is sufficient without speclfy1ng the pa:rt1.cular statute rehed on, so th~s
objection is also invalid.

4. Anderson sued Brovm, Carter

an~ Daniel in the Circui~ Court of Clarke ?ounty for
injuries sustained by Anderson wlul~ ~ gue~t passenger 1.n Brown 1 s automob1le ~hen
it was involved in a three-'1-ray collJ.sJ.on mth cars operated by Carter and Damel.
Carter within the proper tjmeJI filed his responsive pleading, d('lnying liability to
Anders~n and asserting a claim against Brown and Dr.niel for injuries sustained by

him(Carter ) in t he colli~ion.
Anderson, Brown and Daniel all objected to this procedure.
How ought the Court to rule?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The objection should be overruled. By Rule 3:9 a defendant.
may, at his option, plead as a cross-claim any cause of action that he has against,
one or more other defendants growing out of any matter pleaded in the notice of
motion for judgment.

•
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9 1(orace Katzenjammer filed a bill in equity against Blithe Spirit praying the

specific performance of a contract for the sale of land. The bill ~f complaint described the land in detail and contained an averment that t he part~es had reduced
to writing their agreement for the sale and purchase of the land. The bill further
averred that complainant had tendered payment of the purchase price and had demanded
a deed for the property, and that the defendant had refused to perform her contract.

Blithe Spirit filed an answer to the bill of complaint admitting th~t there· h~~ been
an oral contract for tf1e sale of. the l~d.~ arid that that agreement had been r educ ed.
to writing but had b~en signed only by per, and that Katzenjammer had not signed thG
wrh,ten agreement. Further ansvrering, &he averced that the written agreement was not
under seal, and that, although Katzenjammer had tendered payment of the purchase
price and demanded a deed, she refused to accept payment and to deliver a deed.
How ought the sufficiency of the answer be tested, and how ought the Court rule?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(a) The sufficiency of the answer could be tosted by a motion
to strike, or, in this case, by setting the cause down for acgument on bill and
answer since all the undisputed facts are in the two pleadings. See Lile's Equity
Pleading and Practice(Meade's Ed. ) ##228 to #231.
(b) The court should rule for complainant. The Statute of Frauds only requires the
party to be charged(i.e. the defendant) to sign. The statute is meant for the protection of those who did not sign, and thus might be at the mercy of unscrupulous or
mistaken people who might testify falsely that defendants had orally promised, and
not for the protection of those who have signed and thus have clearly promised.
187 Va.lOl.
'Db.?.

1 • Defendant filed a demurrer to plaintif'f 1 s motion for judgment on the ground that
it did not state a cause of action. The demurrer was argued on Nov.l,l962, and on
tha same day the Court entered the following order:
.,,This case came on to be heard and the Court is of the opinion that the demurrer
is well founded and should bepustained:
"In consideration whereof,lit is ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the demurrer be, and
it hereby is, sustained-, to which action ' of the court the plaintiff excepts.n
On January 3, 1963, plaintiff filed a motion requesting l eave to amend his
motion for judgment. State whether or not the Oourt could allow the request?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Yes, the court in its discretion could allow the request .
Rule 3:13 reads in ?art, "Leave to ~~n~ shall be lib?rally granted in furtherance
of the ends of just~ce. 11 Merely sUBta~mng or overrullng a demurrer is not a final
disposi tion of the case unless the court goes further and dismiss es the cas e . Hence
the 21 day time limitation on the court's control over f i nal judgments has no
application. 194 Va .394.

•
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5 ~0n July 1, ]961 John Rucker, being somewhat intoxicated, drove his automobile to

•

•

the wrong side of the road and collided with an oncoming automobile, instantly killing the passenger therein, Ida Cole, and injuring the driver, Millie Cole, both of
these parties being adults. an Septafuber 2, 1961 Millie qualified as administratrix
of the estate of Ida Cole, and on Sept.l0,1962 she retained Attorney Will Dawson to
represent her personally in an action for personal injuries, and also to represent
her as administratrix in an action for the wrongful death of Ida Cole. On August 1,
1963 Dawson filed both a motion for judgment against Rucker seeking a recovery for
Millie's personal injuries, and a;motion for judgment against Rucker for the administratrix seeking a recovery for the wrongful death of Ida. Process in each action was
properly served on Rucker on August 6,1963, and on August 26,1963 he came to you and
said that he wanted to resist the actions to the utmost. You agreed to represent him.
What pleading or pleadings would you file in each action? When would you do so?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Note that the two year statute of limitations has run on each
cause of action. As to the personal injury case I would rely on the running of the
statute in my grounds of defense. It would be an affirmative defense by way of confession and avoidance. Burks Ple~ding and Practice (4th Ed:) #236.
As to the death action, whenever a right is ~reated by statute and the time within
which such right must be asserted is laid down in the statute, then the time so provided is of the right, and not of the remedy, and the motion for judgment must
affirmatively show that the action was commenced within the time allowed. If it does
not so show, it is bad on its face and subject to demurrer or motion to strike.
161 Va.373.
A demurrer or grounds of defense should be filed within 21 days of August 6-the date defendant was served. Rule 3:5.
6•D'o"?n Sept.3,1963 in the Circuit Court of Southampton County, Butcher, a resident of
Southampton County, instituted an a otion at law to recover damages for a tort al1;ogedly committed in Nansemond County. The action was brought against Baker, a resident
of Isle of Wight County, and Baker was served with process at his home. Baker retained Miller as his attor1~y, and through a ·misunderstanding, Mil]er believed that
Baker lived in Southampton County. Miller, being very doubtful, but thinking that
perhaps the motion for judgment, as a matter of law failed to state a cause of action
on which plaintiff would be entitled to recover, filed a demurrer but did not file
grounds of defense, this being done on Sept.20,1963. On Sept.21, Miller saw Baker
and learned definitely that he lived in Isle of Wight County. Miller, believing it
would be to Baker's advantage to have the case tried in another county, on the same
day prepared and filed with the Clerk of the Qircuit Court of Southampton County an
affidavit setting forth grounds which showed without question that Miller's failure
to have the proper information as to Baker's residency was entirely excusable, together with the appropriate pleading to raise the issue involved.
OU;Js
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(a) What appropriate pleading did Miller file? What would be the eround or ground~·
for. same, and wha~ ~ould be the essential alleg~tio?s contqined in said pleading?
- (o) What disposltlon s ahould be made of the pleading?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(a) Miller filed a plea in abatement to test the venue. The
ground for the ple.a would be that the proper venue was in Isle of Wight County where
defendant lived, or in Nansemond County where the cause of action, if any arose.
The essential allegations of such a plea would be that defendant was not ~ resident
of Southampton County but of Isle of Wight County, and that the supposed cause of
action, nor any part thereof, did not aris~ in Southampton County but in Nansemond
County; i.e. the defendant must give plaihtiff a better writ.
(b) Rule 3:6 expressly provides that no plea in abatement shall be filed by a defendant after he has demurred, pleaded in bar, . or pleaded to the merits. The court
should order the plea stricken •

5.1t~iunes owned an antique desk which Roberts bought from him for $1,000 1 and which

Roberts paid, saying:''Keop the desk for. me until tomorrow and I will send a.nd get
it.n Later the same day, William~ was at the James home, saw the desk, and offered
James $1,500 for it. James accept.ed the offer, got the money, delivered thlt desk to
vlilliams and left for parts unknown.
Roberts tells you the above facts and he wants you to get the desk for him, saying
Williams had it and claimed to own it.
(a) What form of ac~ion would you institute?
(b) Assuming both parties are residents of Wythe Coupty, in what court or courts
might the action be brought?
{c) Ho~-1 would it be instituted?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(a) A motion for judgment/in detinue.
(b) It could be brought in the County Court of \·Jythe County since the value of the
desk does not exceed $2,000, or, it could be brought in the Circuit Court of Wythe
County since the value of the desk exceeds $300.
(c) The action would be instituted in the County Court either by civil warrant or
notice of motion for judgment. It would be instituted in the Circuit Court by filing
in the clerk's office a motion for judgment and paying the required writ tax and
deposit against costs.

91~horney

Edmunda represented plaintiff in a certain cou.rt action against the defendant, alleging plaintiff was injur9d as a result of defendant's negligence, where·
in defendant was represented by Attorney Fuller. A jury trial of the action resulteo
in a verdict en March 3, 1964, for the plaintiff. Defendant's Attorney Fuller moved
to set the verdict aside and enter judgment for the defendant on the ground that the
verdict was contrary to the lavl and the evidence, or in the alternative, to grant
defendant a new trial because of errors committed during trial. This motion was
continued and was argJ.ed April 1, 1964, and the judge overruled the motion and
entered final judgment for the plaintiff on the same daye
Fuller then requested the court reporter to transcribe the evidence and though the
reporter promised that the transcript would be ready in fifteen days, he came ill
and the transcript of the evidence was not delivered to Fuller until the morning of
Hay 23, 1964. On the same day, Fuller served written notice on Edmunds that the
transcript was in Fuller's office, available for inspection, and would be presented
to the judge in his chambers on May 29, 1964, at 10:00 a~m. for certification. It
was so presented, but E&nunds was not present at trus time and gave no explanation
for his absence. In spite of Fuller's urging the judge to sign the transcript at
o.-:...~. ..

the tL"lle, the judge assured him th&t he would talce care of it in at least two days'
time, but became busy and finally certified the transcript by signing it on June 8,
1964. It was delivered to the clerk on the same dayo
Fuller, believing that the judge would certify the transcript, had filed with the
cl erk on May 29, 1964, a notice of appeal and assignments of error, the assignments
of err or being as follows:
11
(1) The Court erred in entering judgment oh the verdict, as the same was oontrar;v
to the law and the evidence in that the evidence showed as a matter of law that the
defendant was free from negligence and the plaintiff was guilty of contributQry
negligence.
11
(2) Yne Court erred in granting improper instructions on behalf of the plaintiff
and not granting proper instructions on behalf of the defen9.ant. 11
(a) vlas the certification of the transcript timely and sufficient?
(b) Were the notice of appeal and assignments of error timely and sufficient?
(APPELLATE PROCEDURE)(a)Yes. It was tendered to the court within 60 days of the
entry 6f final judgment and signed within 70 days. Opposing counsel was given reasonable opportunity to examins the transcript. (b) The notice of appeal and assignments
of error were timely as they were filed prior to the expiration of 60 days from
final judgment as required by Rule 5:1(4). The first assignment of error is sufficient because it states specifically the reasons relied upon, but the second assignment of error is insufficient. It does not specify what instructions were improper
or why they ·Here improper, or what proper instructions were refused.

•
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s ?lr&ious instituted in the Circuit Court of Surry County on June 1, 1964, a suit in
equity to quiet title to a certain parcel of land by filing his bill in the clerk's
office, to which were atta~hed numerous docume~ts referred to in the bill as exhibits
Bestman, Cutter, and Driller, all residents of Surry County~ were named defendants.
Bestman and Cutter were served with process on June 15, 1964, but, after having the
process for Driller in hand for twenty-two days, the sheriff made his return that he
had been unable to effect service on Driller.
Bestman feels that he has a valid defense to the suit and a valid claim for relief
against Anxious in regard to a matter concerning the property in question and wishes
to do whatever is necessary to establish his claim and, therefore, consults bis
attorney on June 26, 1964.
Cutter intends to dispute Anxious' claim and notes that ncne of the copies of the
bill served on the defendants bave copies of the exhibits attached to them and that
these documents are very mat:.erial to the issues and are necessary to have for
answering the bill. Accordingly, Cutter raises the question as to Anxious' right to
proceed with the suit since no copies of the exhibits were attached to the copy of
the bill served on him, and also, consults his attorney on J une 26, 1964.
(1) What can and should Anxious do in regard to effe::J.ting valid service on Driller?
(2) What can and should Bostman do in regard to asserting (a) his defense to the
sui t, and (b) his claim flor relief against Anxious?
(3) Is Cutter's contention in regard to Anxious' failure to attach copies of the
exhibits Yalid?
(EQUI'I'Y PL8:ADING) (1) Sinct: Driller is a residGnt of Surry County he should have
him served by tacking process on the front door of his residen~e; or, file an
affidavit
that he cannot be found and then serve him constructively by means of an
order of publication as per Rule 2 : 6 (b) •
(2)(a) Bestman should assert his defense within 21 days either by filing responsive
pleadings as per Rule 2:7 or an answer as per Rule 2: 11.
(b) He should file a cross-bill against Anxious to test his claim for relief
agf:.~~st him.
No, Cutter's contention is not valid. Rule 2:3 re ads in part, "It is not
required that copies of exhibits filed with the bill be furnished or served ...

Wa£}

6.Df1final

judgment in favor of Defendant wa.s ~n~ered June ~5, 1962 • On ,July 25~
Plaintiff filed with the Cler ! of t he tnal court not1.ce of a ppeal_and ass:J.gnment~ of error. On Augu.st 27, 1962 J counsel f?r Defenda.Ilt accepted ser~1.ce of a
notiue that the tr2.nscript of t he e !fidence would be presented to the tr1.al court
. tification en August 28 1962, Although pr8sent.ed t o the court on that day,
for
'
.
· Slgna·
·
t ure and _was
the cer
transcript was never presP-nted
to oppos1.n~
couns e 1 f'or h. l.~
not signed at the end by counsel for a~l part.1.es •. T~e cert1.f1.~at~ of the tnal
judge was that the transcript twas te[:oered and s1.gn'-'d. by me v:l th1.n 70 days after
final judgment."
Among tho incidents of the trial ~he tran0cr ipt contained the following which
l962

ef signad as error:
Question by Plaintiff 's couns el:
.
" Q" Witn0ss state what Defendant was do1.ng when you first saw him?
nDefendant's counsel-'! object'; the Court- 'Objection sustained ';
Counsel for Plaintiff- ~Exception noted . 1 n.
(J. ) Should the appeal be granted?
(2) If g·~r.nted should this assignment of error be considered?
/PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(l) No. The tender of t he tanscript to the Court within 6o
days of final judgment is jQ~ isdictional. 204 Va.533 on p.)99.3 of the Pleading
and Practice Cas0s of these Notes.
(2) No. The grounds for objection must show what the expect?d a!1~W8r woL~ld have
b
that the Appellate Court can t ell vrhether the errcr, 1.f any, was harmless
80
0 ;e~rejudicial. See 1 M. J . (Appeal and Error) #J05 •

w~ s

7~P~iter~ a widower~

su~

died intestate July 1, 1951, seized of a farm and lea7ing
hun three chll.dren, Tom, Dick and Harry. For several years before his death
Pater had entrusted the possession and management of the farm to T\:lm, who had
operated it as if it 1.;ere his ownft Di~k a nd his ~rife, by a writt2n agreement dated
July 10, ::!..962, contracted to sell Dick's interest. in the land to Harry, but later
Dick informed Harry that he had changed his mtnd and they wouldn't carry out the
agreement. Tom continued in poosessi.on of the farm and in July 1 1964, Dick brought
•:mi t for partition, making Tom and Hr:..rry parti es. Proc <:>ss -vms sen·ed on Ha:rry,
July 8, 1964 ~ On ,July 12, 1964, HeT!'Y consults you, tells you the foregoing facts
and asks you the following q tl0.fY~ionr:::
(a) May he in the present pr0ceeding, and if so how~ seek 2.n accounting from Tom
because of h:Ls management of the fa.r.m?
(b) May he, in the preS'ent proc;ceding, and if so h0<-1. seeu::-e an adjudication ef
his right to compel Dick and his wife to comply with the cales contract?
How ought you to answer these qu.astions?
(PLF.ADING AND PRACTICE) (a ) Yes. Tom is a co-d efendant, and Rllle 2:14 reads in
part, 11 A defendant may by cross-bill filed by leave of cow:·t assert against other
defendants or against new parties any claim germane to the subject matter of the
v~vJ.ng

.:'.lUi
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(b) As against tbe plaintiff , Dick, Rule 2:13 provirles that a de.fmdant may file
in t he clerk's office, within 21 clays after ser•.rice or thereafter by leave of
cour-i:. a cross-bill which seeks relief c.::_:c>.ir1st t he plaintiff. But Dick's l-Jife was
not a plaintiff. But Rule 2:14 above applies to her as these matters are all
germane to the suit all parties c_a n be brought. l.n as per the above tv1o Rules.
'

9,-VP~laintiff, while driving his automobile~ was injured in an accident that s.lso
inv-ohred three other motor v ehicles operated cy X, Y and Z. Thinking that he had a
s ·l;rong case against X and y and at best or~y a ~reak case against Z, Plaintiff
b:cot1ght a:t action for $15,000 for peruonal injuries in the Circuit Court of Au.gust a
County against X and Y, charging each with negligence that proximately caused the
a.ccideni:.o You are employed by Y, who does not like Z and who wants to be informed.
fully as to his rights. He is particularly interested in knowing which, if any ,
of the following claims y may assert in the pending action against the par~ies
named.:
(A) His claim against
for $25,000 for personal injuries arising out of th0
same accidento
(B) His claim against the Plaintiff and X, or either of them, for ~~25 ,000 for
personal injuries arising out of the same accident.
(C) His claim against the Plaintiff and X, or either of them, for ~14,000 for
personal injurie:3 arising out of another c-.ccident.
(D) His claim a.gainst the Plaintiff on the latter's nego t iable note for $5,000
which is past due.
(E) His claim against the Plaintiff and X, o>:> e;i the:- of them, on an open account
for ~~2,000.
(PIJEA.DING AND PRACTICE) (A) No. z is neither plaintiff or co-defendant and Rule 3:9.1
specifically forbids third party prt:'.cticc.
(B) Yes. By Rule 3:8 a defendant may countercla:i.m against the plai ntiff whether
or not the claim arises out of the s uit. and whe·liher or not it arises in tort or
contract. By Rule 3:9 he mc•Y cross-claim ae~im;t another defendant for any matter
growing out of the claim for which he is being sued.
(C) Yes ~s to the Plaintiff aB per Rule J;8 abvve; No as to X as such a claim
does not arise out of the suit. (P.. ule 3:9 above)
(D) Yes as per Rule 3:8 above.
(E) Yes as per nule 3:8 as against Plaintiff; No as r-er Rule 3:9 as to X.

•
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lOo
a pending action by Smith against Daisy Dairy Corpc,ration(hereinafter called
("Daiayn) in the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchbur g fer $25,000 for personal
injuries caused by the explosion of an ammonia compre.ssor at Daisy ' s place of
business in the City of Lynchburg, Daisy sought. to take the deposition of Smith in
ordar to a8certain the names and addresses of Smith's witnesses and to secure from
•
Smith the contents of medical reports j.n his possession concerning his physical and
mental condition. Smith opposed the taking of his deposition for any purpose and
particularly with respect, to the mecl.ical rcpo rt8. His poei tion concerning the
medical reports was that they were privileged in that t.hoy were based upon a confidential relationship E:Xist.ing betv;een physician and patiEmt.
(A) What steps must be taken, and w'.1.::.t munt. be sho1·m, by Daisy to obtain an order
requiring Smith to give a d.is~o-..rery d;:.pcsi"\:.ion?
(B) May the order requiring the d is~overy d.eposi tion dire0·0 Smith to disclose
the names and addrosses of Smith 1 s w-it.nes~es, and direct him to produce the medical
R~ ~ ~I
reports?
Cpt..ttt-t~)
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) (A) Rule 3~ ~~ 3(r.:) roads, <ton motion of any party, the court,
fJ.i.J. ·"4 · 0 . , if satisfied by affidavit: testimony, :i.nspcction of the pleadings or otherwise that
f;v1b
~~ the moving part.y in good faith desire~ access by way of discovery t.o evidence, the
~~ LT·
names and addresses of witnessea, or other information subject to the control of
~ ~ the adverse part.y or of a third pe::.~son, shall permit the taking oilt a deposition for
:f(~t;t;;;:::..J. discoYery and shall en~er an orde:r requi:cing the adverse party ~r ~uch third
.,._#.J,.l,_~ ~
person to attend at a t:une and pla.r;e and before a notary or comm1SS1oner named in
_, ~ ·'
the order and to answe:r questions relevant t o subjects named in the order and to
lt;J;J(j~l make available for inspection, :;opying or photographing any writing, chattel or
~t-..J.J;... real property described in the order. The court shall d eny the motion i f it finds
{.~ .::., 'i,t._~ . that gran·t.ing the motion vrould unrea sona~~y delay the case or impose unreasonable
-,..--.... hardship or expense on the adverse party. ·
(B) Yes. V#8- 289 .. 1 which has to do with privileze between physicians and patients
contains the following proviso:nprovidod: however, that when the physical or mental
condition of the patient is at. issue in such ation, suit or proceeding or when __
a _._.

•

ju::?.o 0 of a court of record, in the exercisa of sound diEcretion, deems such d:i.3e;lo; ur e necessary to the proper administ.ra"dcn of jus tice, no fact c ornR.unic.1t0•l tc,
or otherwise l earned by, suc.h practitioner in connection with such atte~1anJe, ex<.LJil·•
i:<ation or treatment shall be privileged anci disclosure may be required . And see
204 Va. 11 on p.470 of Evidence Cas ec in these Notes.
/
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respect to an i~ue out of chancer~ in a Virginia court, state(A) What is its purpose?
(B) What should a party do to seek it?
(C) To what extent is the result of such an issue binding on the chancellor?
( PLEADI NG AND PRACTICE)(a) The purpos~ of a writ out of chancery is to obtain a
finding of a material fact that is in such dispute that the chancellor needs the help
of a jury.
(b) By V#8-214 any court in which a chancery suit is pending shall have the discretion to direct an issue to be tried before any proof has been taken by either the
plaintiff or defendant if it shall be shown by affidavit after reasonable notice that
the case will be rendered doubtful by the conflicting evidence of the opposing par~y
(c) The verdict of ~he jury is ordinarily only advisory.
v ~
/

7.:ftJhne driving north on U.s. Route 29, Tom Crock, a resident of Alberrnarle CountJr
collided with a vehicle being driven south on the same Route by Ben Bard, a resident
of Fauquier County. The collision occurred in Culpeper County. Shortly thereafter
Crock brought an action against Bard in the Circmit Court of Albermarle County
charging Bard with negligence in the operation of his vehicle and asking damages of
$5000. In response to Crock's motion for judgment, Bard filed a demurrer which recited, "Comes now the defendant and demurs to the plaintiff's motion for judgment
and as the ground of such demurrer aver,s that _this court is without proper venue to
hear the plaintiff's action." How should the court rule on the demurrer?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The demurrer should be over-ruled. Venue should be tested
by a plea in abatement one of the requirements of 1.-.rhich would be to inform plaintiff
as to the proper venue--i.ee "Give him a better \VTit". See Vf/8 -133.

:JI._ -:."'
10. From which, if any, of the following orders or decrees of the Circuit Court may
the losing party properly petition for an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals?
(a) An order setting aside a verdict for mhe plaintiff for $15,000 in an automobile
tort action and granting a new trialo
(b) A decree in a chancery suit adjudicating that the plaintiff, Rosemont Development Corporation, instead of the defendant, XYZ Corporation, is the owner of a house
and lot in Roanoke and directing a rpecial co~nmissioner to ascertain the liens
against the property.
(c) A decree holding invalid plaintiff's claim of an-alleged mechanic's lien of
$250 on a house and lot which defendant had purchased f :com owner while the house
was under constructiono
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(A) Since this is not a final order and no exception applies,
no appeal lies. (B) Since the decree adju.di~ates the principles of the cause and
affects the title to land it is appealable despite the fact that it is not final.
(C) Since, as far as plaintiff is concerned, no title to land is involved and the
pecuniary matter is less than $300 ·C.ha decree is not appealable. See V/lfl-462 and
201 Vao934.j" 'I- t./6, 'I
/

5 P tri" an action to recover damages for personal injuries growing out of a.n automobile collision, Sam Rakes charged in his motion for judgment that the defendant,
Gus Mars, was guilty of negligence in three particulars, namely:
nDriving to defendant's left of the cen::ber of the highw·ay and entirely
in plaintiff's lane of travel;
·
r:Driving at an unlawful and excessive rate of speed; and
nFailure to keep a proper lookout."
Mars filed the gelling grounds of defense and no other pleadings:
nDefendant states his grounds of defense as follOlfS!
11 1. Defendant denies that he oparated his car on the wrong side of the road,
as charged in the motion for judgment8
"2o Defendant denies that he drove his car at an unlawful and excessive
speed, as charged in the motion for judgment ~
"3. Defendant denies that he failed to keep a proper lookout, as charged
in the motion for judgment.
/ s/ Gus Mars 11
During the trial of the action plaintiff offered evidence to prove the averments
contained in the motion for judgment and rested. Defendant then offered to prove
that plaintiff drmve his car partially into defendant's lane of travel and that the
collision occurred while both vehicles were in the center of the hi ghway. Counsel
for plaintiff objected to t he introduction of this evidence, How should thh court
rule?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The objection should be sustained, Defendant cannot introduce evidence of Plaintiff's contributory negligence unless he relies thereon in his
statement of his grounds of defense, or Plaintiff's own ev5.dence shows that Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence,. Rule #3:18 (h).

6 :P ~in Skin commenced an action in the Circmit Court of Albermarle County, V2.• ,
Cl r,; "'in:Jt Hard Boiled to recover damag3G for defamation~ The motion f or judgment ~ 0 ~ 1J.:.ained two counts, one alleging facts upon which recovery was sought for ao!lnnon l av1
slander the other count charging facts · upon which a recovery was sought, under the
i nsulting words statute of Virginia. The motion for judgment did not aver f acts
s uff:i.,:i ent to enti tle plaintiff to recover, and within twenty··one days aft0r lK :;:;_(~e
of motion, for judgment was served on the defendant, counsel f or def endant f iled,
as his only pl eading, a motion for summary judgment.
How should the court rule on the motion for summary judgment?
~PLEADING AND PRACTICE) The Cou:rt should overrule the motion. A motion for summ'lry
JUdgment cannot be used as a substitute for a demurrer, nor can such a motion be
granted before the parties are at issue. Rule 3:20 and 200 Va.604.

•
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7. In October of 1964, Ben Gum paid $30,000 to Tom Blunt, and in exchabge received
from Blunt and recorded a deed purpo::.~ting to convey to Gu_'ll nRosemont Farm"· on which
Blunt lived in Augusta County, Va. Shortly thereafter Blunt moved to th1 City of
Roanoke. In November of 1965, Gum le2rned that Alfred Farr of Cleveland, Ohio, a
few days before had recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Augusta
County a deed dated Jun~ 16, 1962, which deed purported to show conveyance of
"Rosemont Farm"' by Blunt, to Farr. Gum at once questioned Blunt concerning t!1e
matter. Blunt admitted to Gum that be had delivered a deed to Farr before his
dealing with Gum 9 but added that the deed had been delivered to Farr on the condition of payment of the pur~hase price, that. Farr had failed to make payment, and
that he did not consider the deed to Farr -to be binding ~
Gum now consults you and asks(a) ~-Jhere artd by what court proceeding he might have
determined his ownership of 11'Rc-semont. Farm11 , and (b) By v1hat means, if any, he migh~·
in such proceeding obtain s2r'Vice on Farr as a party defendant.
How should you answer each of these questiC!lr?
(PJJEADING AND PRACTICE) The venue of the suit !.s August<:>. County, Va. as this would
be a suit in rem to remove a cloud on the title and such a auit l-muld lie in the
county in which the land is situated . Another way would be for Gum to seek a
declaratory judgment to the effel.~t that Farr has no interent in the land. As for
service of process, if Farr is sarved personally in Ohio that is the equivalent of
service by publication in Virginia. And under the recently passed "Long Arm Statuten
V#8-8l.l et seq .service on the Secretary of the Commonwealth is the equivalent of
personal servi~e on Farr in Virginiao
pb s
8 .. Tom Botts was indicted in the Circuit Court of Hanover County, Va. for murder.
On his arraig~ent he entered a plea of not guilty, was tried and convicted of fir::r t
dagree murder. After the jury had been discharged, but before sentence had been
imposed, Botts moved the court to permit him to >'li thcJraH his plea of not guilty and
to file a plea in abatement to the indictment on the ground that the grand jury had
not been legally summoned and two members of the grand jui7 were disqualified by lavr
to act as grand jurors •
The court overruled the motion, whereupon the defendant moved to set asi de the
verdict as contrary to the law and the evidence. This latter motion was aJs o·
overruled. Proper exceptions were noted by Botts to all rulings of the court. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals, Botts assigned as error the action of the
trial court in overruling his motion to \-lithdraw his plea of not guilty and to file
a plea in abatemento The record on appeal showed that before entering a plea of no·':.
gllilty, Botts and his counsel knew that the grand jury had been improperly summoned.
and that two of the grand jurors were not qualified to serve.
·
How should the court rule on this assignment of error?
(Pleadlng and Practice) The cour·t should r ule that this assignment of error is without merit. The motion came too lv.te. Obj ectd!ons to the method of summoning the
grand jury or to the qualifications of particular jurors mus t be made at a preliminary state of bhe case, that is, before a plea to t he merits(l93 Va.814). The
court will not permit the defendant to play fast and loos e with it--if acquitted
to go free--if convicted to have a new trial--and this is particularly true when
defendant had knowledge of all the facts from the beginning.

9 b~erb Adam brought an action against George Ross in the County Court of Chesterfidd. County, and there recovered judgment. for $865. Ross promptly and properly
a 1Jp~a led the Cd.Se to the Cir·~ui t C01_1rt of Chesterfield County. Duriflg. th"" tria;L o:;_·
ths case before a jury in the Circu1t Court, counsel for Adam asked h::Lm the fol::.•Y.i··
inO' auestion:
ttDid you, or did you not, obtain a judgment against George Ross in
1
·l:,hio same case when it l-Jas tried in the County Court of Chesterfield County'? 11
Counsel for Roos immediately objected to the question.
Should the Circuit Court have sustained the objec'\iion?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE ) Yes, the objection should be sustained. The trial on appeal
is a trial de novoo '((,)hat happened in the County Court is completely irrelevanc o

3J~y-Products Corporation fiJ. t>d a. bill in equity in the Circuit Court of Goochland
County, Virginia, against Williu.m S:;;nur:: ls, trading as County Shopping Center. The
purpose of the suit ·~oyas to enforce th8 Hen of a deed of trust on the land and
buildings owned by Sav;1uels and us ed by him in the operation of his business. After
the defendant had ans w·~ .·."e~, the Court entered a decree of reference to a Master
Commissioner of the Court with directions to report to the Court all of the assets
of the defendant, the liens thereon and the order of their priority. After the
entry of the decree of reference, Ball Point Company commenced a suit in the same
court to enforce its judgment lien against the same property of Samuels. Novelty
Company and Wholesale Company held judgment liens on the same property of Samuels
and each proved the amount of their debts and their judgment liens before the
Master Commissioner.
1. Samuels appeared in the suit filed by Ball Point Company and moved the Court
to dismiss the suit or to suspend the prosecution thereof.
How should the Court rule on this motion?
2. By-Products Corporation appeared in the suit that it commenced and advised
the Court that Samuels had paid it one-half of the amount due on its lien and that
it had accepted a note for the balance, secured by a deed of trust on other property
of Samuels and it moved that the Court dismiss its suit. How should the Court rule
on this motion?
3. Seashore Amusement Co. held a judgment lien against Samuels which became
barred by the Statute of Limitations after the decree of reference was entered in
the suit commenced by By-Products Corporation. Nevertheless, Seashore Amusement
Company appeared before the Master Commissioner in that suit and submitted proof of
its claim. Samuels filed a plea of the Statue of Limitations to this claim.
How should the Court rule on this plea?
(EQUITY PROCEDURE) Part 1. Motion should be granted. The order of reference changed
the original suit into a general creditor's suit and operated as an injunction
against the institution of another creditor's suit against the same estate. (tile
#432)The correct course for Ball Point to follow would have been to obtain leave of
court to file an intervenor's petition in the pending suit under Equity Rule 2:15,
or to merely prove its debt before the Master Commissioner under the original
order of reference, in which case it will be treated in all respects as a party
to the suit. 68 Va.922.
Part 2. By-Products has lost dominion over the suit by the order of reference made
for the benefit of all creditors and therefore no dismissal.
Part 3. Statute of limitations tolled by the order of reference as to claims proved
thereunder. Citations: Lyles, Equity Pleading, #430. Code #8-20.
4f'~~ March 31, 1966, Machen instituted an action at law in the Circuit Court of the
City of Norfolk against New Town Stores, Inc., and John Goodman, doing business as
Old Time Restaurant, seeking a recovery of ~~25,000. The motion for judgment alleged
that on January 2, 1965, as Machen was leaving the grocery store, whi ch was owned
and operated by New Town Stores, Inc., he Has caused to fall and was injured because
of a negligently maintained doorway; that he proc eeded to his automobile, which was
parked in front of the adjoining establishment , Old Time Restaurant, but because of
feeling faint from his injuries, he sat down in fr ont of the restaurant, that
Goodman negligently procured and administered to him a substance which turned out to
be concentrated household ammonia, from the ingestion of which he sustained permanent internal injuries. New Town Stores, Inc., was served with process on April 1,
1966, but Goodman was not served until May 2, 1966. What pleading should have been
filed by counsel for each defendant and when?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Each of the defendants should file a demurrer within 21 days
for misjoinder of causes of action. These were separate and divisible torts, as to
which of the injuries were distinct, external in one c~se, internal in the other,

•
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and there was no concert of action. The two events did not culminate in the same
injury. Burkes, #212; Norfolk, 188 Va.288. Acceptable alternative would be motions
to dismiss or elect rather than demurrer. 102 Va.l48; 118 Va.$21.

5~~Erter

•

sued Newton in the County Court of the County of Surry, seeking a recovery
in the sum of $47 for property damage to his automobile as the result of Newton's
alleged negligence in a certain automobile accident. Fefore this case was trie 1 ~
Newton, who was injured in the accident, sued Porter jn tb 9 Clrcu~_·::. Court o:f S1 ~.::-:r:y
Co1mty, seeking a recovery for personal injuries for $~' S »0 00, e.J.le:i:ri.ng tb.::. t .Pr,r t.::-r ~ s
negligence caused the accident. Upon trial of the acti(-n in 'lih G Co;.mt.y (k t •. r t .ll
judgment was rendered in favor of Porter in the sum of $47 . Porter there•.:;.pon filed
a plea of res judicata and a motion to dismiss in the a•'1tion of Newton a g.:".ins t
Porter still pe~ding in the Circuit Court. Newton fil'3 L1 a motion to r.=je·:rt:, -~he
plea on the er·;-:>anJ that the .)·J.ogm:=-•nt in the County Court v1as contra::-y to the la-;.r and
the evideY:I'. ~~ 8.nc1 i·.Yas not reo j l.~'-U r :~ta becanse:
(a) Th:3 r.our:Lty Com··v was a c or x··t. not of record, and a3 an inferior court,
its j1~dgm.::nt ,,rou.ld not be binding on the Circuit Court, which was a
court of r i:Y~ord ..
(b) Th~.t the £:ub;j~ct matter w.?.s not the same, one cause being for property
darr.~.g 0 to Porter's automobi.la and the other for personal injuries to
New+.(m.
(c) 'l.'l.1.:...t even th()ugh th~ Cou.n·::,y Court judgment was clearly erroneous, it we.13 not
appe.alable to the Circuit Cc·urt or mr:r other court of record beca tls e i t vv r.\S
for only $h7, whi~h was below the $!50 requi red jarisdio ~donal amount n11'1 •
therefore> the ju.'.igment could not be considered res judtcatat for t0 do
would depriYe Ne~·ton of his legal rights w:i."!:.hout a con;plete judicial hearing.
Hm-r shoulc~ the Gircu:l t Court rule on each cont•Jntion?
(PL"S.\DING AND PRACTICE) ~a) Innn::Lt'=lrial as to res j"udicata that county court was a
con.'.."·li not of r ~~.:. o :rd. P3trus, 1.96 Va.322.
(b ) The issue wa,J of negligence arising out of the same accident and therefore the
f1 n rl:>.mental issue is the same.
(t:) The fact t h2.t county court judgment was not appealable did not af.foct appli~a
bility of res j udic ata ... Ander son, 189 Va. 793 o
(P<:.: rhaps Newto:l should have counter-claimed in the county court for the juri:JQtc.t :ional amount and t hen removed to the circuit court on increase of amo~~ffi of
counter-claim)

so
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Bat·~:.e ~r:< ,

a

p~~omi.sing

young attorney, has just lost his first big r.arte in
Jndge, clearly ignored the holding of the Su.rrcme
C c1.,;~t. of A !;~)e<tk of llir~inia i n the "Holdover Case" decided less than four month3
pr,::viously on the preci s d i s;:me.
Youngblood moved to f:~t as:Lde the verdict. This motion was ove!'ruled and Youngblood noted his exce:p ~ions. After filing a notice of appeal and e.ssignrnents of
er ror, and eft a;: pr ocu.:ring o. certification of the tro.nG•::ript of the evlc:ence and
other incidtSnt.s c•f t lvJ t:·ia:l. 9 You.~.gblood prepared and presented a peti t ii;.n for
a.ppeal to the So.: :r::o t;mo Court of AppGals • The petition f or appeal consi:3td entirely
of a brief na:!' :>:!t:l. va statement. of the facts of the casl3, and argument ir:. the
following langu?. ~;-3:
"While t.hi ':l case, filed ,r.:muary 15, 1966, was pending a similar defense
in a case cf simi lar fa-~ts was considered and di f:po sed of by this
court in the case of Holdover v. Landlord, 212 Va. 3, 140 S.E. 2d 312.

,,. ~~ :: r h

th~ \ C :Lr ~ui t

"The Holdover decision 1..ras announced after answe:!'s were filed to the
petition in t he ca se a -:j bar. We respectfully subT~iit that the Lower
Court in ent ering t.he j1l..:igment herein complained of wholly ignored the
law a s was announ-;;ed ii1 ·the Holdover Case."
E:r.:periene ~ ,counsel for app(.)J..lee, moved the Court to dismiss the petition for
aooeal. How should the Court rule on the motion?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) Rule 5:3 of the Rules of Court provid es that the petition
f
al in form and contents shall conform in a ll r es pects to the requirements
f~~ ~~~~~lant's opening brief. Rule 5:12, a1 s et s forth a number of re~uirements,
such a s statement of the proceedi ngs in the lower court, clear and conc1se state.
ment of the facts, each assignment of error to be suppo~ted by statement o~
principles of l aw, argument and authorities, none of whlch have be en complled Wlth,
' and ao ellee ' s motion should be grant ed. Ni chol as, 180 Va . 203.
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be
)istribut o:r· wrote"'... 0nUf2.ctlirer a letter 111 vvhich Ma st;, ted ~
"If you
1_.,: Li.l dulivc;r r·.e twenty gross of /..Y I; P..t):Jlianc..;s, I will deliv r. t nem
to th '2 wiJ.olesaL-j r ;·, td el th~r collc~ct the i.mrcn . :<Se lJrice from hun cJ nd
r c:r~ti t it to yoLl, or I will p ·y it myself."
i•· ::mufa cturer accept~d 'the
of.l:'er 1~..n d, .:;urau~mt the reto, ship ~~ ed t!le <::.pplL·nces to ')istributor.
, ot r t~ c e ivin (l: tho _Jurch::1se price, 1 anufacturcr sul.)d )istributor .Cor
it i~ the 1n ·J.:;e r Gircui "t C..mrt, alleginF· in hts 11·.otion f or jud;~-m e nt
t tb.t t m~ <=~ . pli nnc :s had bee n shipped to ;)istributor, and t h ~-:·. 1. he had
0 i t h ·.:r fai.lc;:;d to colL; ct :t'rom ·,zlolcs ·,ler, or if hn h 0d collected, he
h··d .T.' c::.il ed to r emit tne mrcl'l ;-:~.sc price to • r nu.f ~1 ctur 2 r:
tne lett ()r
,,,n s .:>.: -de •') rt of the motion. l)istri butar durr..urr (·:d to tr1e motion on
tile g r ound trr::. t th ;.; allee; . tions \K .•.'e in tne; al t c.: rnati vc 2 ttd did not
st · t .j v:;,ich {~ c o und W !• S r e li (U on :t'o:r r tJcov ,; :r ,~' ·
HO'N ou,,:ht th: Cou~t "to rul e on the de r;,urr·er.
'i'he d.;.nurr-.:r s hculd b ·:~ ove.cruled.
'L'nd ..~ r ,{ule 3 : 1 3 a ple <:l.dint: sh ~dl
be su.t'c.'icL.: nt if it cl .:;arl~/ in/orms t:·Je o p ,,osi te ) <.T ty o:t' thu true
natura of t ic cl ·' im or d e fenst:.
J-:.owevur, alterna tive plc: ·- ·dint::, is
permi t "t :d ''.TiFm tr1 . ple~ ~. u. ,_: r h a s no knowled ~ _: e as to ·,vhich of t wo s et sJ8t shou.ld be n .Ll~ ~:0 d m~ d t L .; o~Juo z i t e ~ > .-~.r· t;r would b(:: e quc.'..'.ly li a')le
ra •
unu l3r e i tn. )r.
·>,2c 20.5 'Fl. • 382.
6-- \{a. ~--roc ,.! du ru . 1)6 (. .
.
.\.lt 0 n '!!8. S o :1e r :: t~n :; hl ~3 a uto ::o rJ J.l e in c, irJc.: stt-)rly di.c c ciion :-.nd atteElpted to overt · ic~ C"Ln d pa s s )ce.n c , 'l"h 0 ~.~, S (;j.l SO 0 p~ r 2. t in ,~ ~ ~'trl hUtomobiLJ in th e s ·FlC d L:c :~ction.
Cr t• rw w .~; s o , e r e-.~, tine his F.lll torno .,ile
in a n 88 st c r ly d i r:,; ct;ion on th .::) s ,· <.t~e hL~ h w<:,.:.y o '1'be .r:·e vV 'c· s a t nree-way
collision, P.G a r ·.; sul t o .r· · ~.rhi. ch all tnre . t-r; otorists were injured.
Cr o--ne insti tutcd an C:.t ·; tion e:1ga inst .' ~ 1 ton And j e ~.' ne to r e covur do:. .mages
for his injuri es .
hl ton fil e d a countercl e:•im a e<:·inst Crane bec ·;.use
of his injurie s e:.nd -)(~~::. n u r'il ·::d a count cr cL·irn ac~ . inst •) r <::m e bcc e.use
o.f his injuries an<i for a HOOO not e Cr ane owed him; h e Fllso fil ~:; ti f}
cross-cl ~ iu1 a ~ a inst ~lton f or pe rsona l injuri 8 s su s t ~ in in the wreck.
'fiz1e ly mot ions were !Ilr-!.d e as follO '?S ~
( \ ) 'l'o strike .)Ut J:.J. tonys count o;; rcl r i:!'L• a g~Jinst Cr n e .
( B)
i.' o strike out :: e r:.ne's count e:,-·cL-,im :·or d a::·. <' , :cs a t-';e in s t Cr ,.ne.
(C) To strike o u.t >ean~J 's count e;·· cl aii:: on t •·;~,; !lote., ·
(:')) 'l 'o strike out 1 i e ;. ~rw's crosscl ~·l im aea inst .·.lton for d 8.nl<-:__cs .

•

i·.ll moti ons s ~ • ollld be ov ~ r rul -" d• (- ,. 5. C.) Under itul e 3 ·8 <'1. ctefend<:.nt u:. y ,,Ji thin 21 -ay s c; ·'"t c r S~.;rvice of n otic .. of !. otion for jud2;ment,
ple a d as <."J. countcn~l ~. irn any c ,·,u. .e of n tion a t law ttu-1 t he h :.:i against th::: i.Jl a intiff or all ph-.intif.Cs jointly. It do w. ~ not H1o t"Lcr 11Vhdlher t he cl a im ::~ riseu 011t o i' th (,; s r·mc tr;:ms 9.ction, wh~t . 1er it is liqumd8.t ed , or whether it aris es ouc of tort or contr ~ ct.
( 0) Lnd e r 1tuie
3:9 a def'end.alC.!t m&y, ··1i t in the S<-J; fLO tin:c li rLi t a s for a countercl a im, ~? 1 e d as c-1. cro nncl _,_im u ':. c c:.use of 9Cti on t l r; t h 0 h f'tS a,:,< .inst
one o r- more oth e r d of,mdnnts g rDwing ot.~.t; of <m;; m c.~ tt . : r ple e.d c d in the
motion fo r judgl!.cnt.

}>'

~
Pedestri~n br o u~t an action BG2ins t
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Call and )hrwin for damace s for
_pe rson c1.l injuri e s a lle gc; d to h n.ve been suffe r e d by hiill in a collis~on ~ctwec ~ an automobil~ op e ~ Rt ~ d-by Call and a truck o~er a t c d by
~arwJ.n. botn of wnom d en1 e d l1 s b1l1ty.
~t the c cnclusion o f a ll the
evide~c ra bo ~ h def ~nd c--. nts mov e d l:or suP.l '' a ry j uct ,::m~n ts in th e ir f a vor
and
t.~ ' e t p l a 1ntiff
for a directed v erd i c t in his f avor • '1'11e~ Judn-e
""a'l· d·•
It '.t . 1
.
t')
v
·, n e h e e v1. 11.~ nc e is somewhat conflicting, y e t I am s a tis f ied th a t
it pre{)ond ·:·r· ,t e s infavor of 6 a ll aga inst Da rwin, t'ler e for e I sustain

•

c a lj_ ·, s i·:otion• and SUI!t:r1ary judgment is t:~r an t e •.i in his fa~or, and ~ s , I
c.L'l s ,.; tisi .f' :)d that l)arwih is liable, I will instruct the JUr~ to f1na
· n f avor of redcstrian against him for such sum, tl.ot exc eed1ne; ~h e
~nount sued for as the jury may believe will cvmpensate red~strl an
for his injuries." Accord.ing ly· , an or~er w.c., s ez:mmred erant1ng. sU!Iillla.ry judt:;;ment in favo: o~ Call and t !l8 Jury ws s l.n~t:ruc~ ~ d t~ f1nd a
v e rdict a g ninst l)arwl.n for th e d ama.::;es p~ove~t , wh1cn t uey dl.d and
judement was enter0d the.:-·eon. .t>rope r <_:~bJ e ctlons w ·:!'e rita de to th8
acti o ns of th ; judge and proper excevt1.ons rre s 8rv:d by a ll parties.
on a ppeal to th e:; :"3upreme Court of A.qper:l.~S of Vr.1.., . now out; ht that Court
d e ci de as to the correctness of the act1.on taken 1.n the lo···'Je r court
With r GSlJCCt to:
( 1) :J all' s motion f or sumr·' ary jude, t~len t;
( 2)
·rh 13 instruction to the jury to find a VG!'d ict in favor of l:"edestrian a.e;ain~:> t Darwin'?
J oth actions cl!ould be r cvers 8d.
(1) Hule 3:20 provid..;s tl:.at sumr:.a ry jud ;~:·te nt sl.H.ll not b e e nt ered if
any :l1a t (~ ri : .1 1 fact ill gcn c1.inely in dis r> u. t e .
(2) Und \.: r ttul e 1:11 an d Code 8-218, tn0 c o urt lilHY not d ir .J ct a v Grdict except after sust Edn Lng a r:,otion to s trik.:: the e v Ldenc e or' th e
opposinG pa.rtj.

9-- 1Te. . r roc edurc
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(1)
iillt~.J · c d decl:ddd . tha t he :!lu s t ~3e·~ k em injunction agains t i 1opez
in ord e r to r e str · ·in the 1 s:t t<ar from in t erf e rrinc vti th cert e:~ in business ri ght s of ·Iillard.
·dlL ..rd instl tut e d t he proper proc0eding in
cha nc e ry in t nc Gircui t Court of f·,orth.hampton Gount,v, but due to various circumstc-; n.c es , a full h~ a rin ;~· on th e injunction could not be obt a ined for s on.e time e..1d j.~op o z h a d g ood r r::,.s on to be li ..J ve tta t he
would los e the t e stimony of c e rt ~, in im .;ort :.: nt wimnesses bece.uo e of
death or remove.l from t he coun'ty befo r e th a t t.ime •
''ihat, if a nything, cru1 Lopez do to prot e ct hi ·· .s e lf a c;ainst a loss of
this testimony'?
( 2)
')alter w s confront E.: d with thiJ same situation in re g ~1. rd to L·urdock, but due to c e rtain circumst :-tnc es , h e could not institute his
suit in th e Circuit r~ ourt of .ortharrip ton Count.v for som ..J time c.nd

h . < g ood r ...;asufl t o b e l it~ ve t t1 r' t h e \Mould lo se "trte 't ~ stimony of
iL.r )ort :J.n t wimncss ..; s be c <:us e of death or r <:! moval fro u1 t!le county before
t rw th •e h "' could institut e suit.
:n 0 t, i ~· an ·.: thinc; , c a n '1Ltk e r do to prote ct hi ;·tself a gai n s t H1e lo ss
of tl·tis t es timony?
"ll _,f tll\l t,
(1)
l_,".nd Gr 'fa . 8-304 and ttul e ): ?~, in a n y pendin{ ~ c as ~::: , tho de position d e be n e OS !.; e of a wn'tlme:m3, may b e t a ken i n this st ,- tc , a:t' t e r the
motio n J'or jud r.;.rr.~n t . or bil l h as been fi l ~- d f ..; r t h....: c;ooc.l f ~ i th pur pos e
of t akin ~ Em d introducin .~ the t e s timony of a win:Js s who 1" 1 <-~ y not b~
acle t0 a tt end tn j tri a l of a c ~se .
·
(2) 1Jn d (; r Va . 8-317, 1vh-::r·e t r1 ~1 ' C is not y es a suit penlinp; one may
fil e h bill in Chan.:.:e ry to PtDIR:e;itua1:lre t 8stimony. 'l_'nc ~~='~ rt:;' d...:s iri r..g
t~a t t ne t ~ s~imony be~ must a ll ..![}..J t hc-.:.t h e is not i n a ,:;~
S1 tion t u br1n ~ a n uct1on wh,;..c'u1n t h G f a cts C<m ,,e i m: e d i a t e ly inv .,,..
ti ~e. t e d t::Ln d the t e ~~i l rJ on.{ should D8 take n t o ;Jr ...: v e nt its lo ss i')efo~· ~ ·
trcr;~ a ction i8 possl.Dle . : :> e·~ N.I/A•.: 203 Va . 665.
c;
i·; a k r;r
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.
·>yl a n, a m ~rnot;r of a swln{3;ln{~ group known ~ s the " oulderinc- , oss-·
h , n ee rs••, r 8 covcr ;d ;_,, jud e:•r~~n t in t..h e Corpora t -~ on Court of the '...:i ty
of Chesapeake, Va., jointly aeainst Gunny e:md Ch•..: r y l in th e trial of
an action at lavv se .-~ki ne: a r e covr.:;1 y f<r d c•.mar,es.
'J ylan all ege d and
prov ~ d th 8.t. h e sust a ined shock End burns as a rc sul t of trw nee li gence
of Cheryl in plug inG a knO '''ffi d efe ctive cord i •:-co his e l e ctric GUitar
and handinG it to 'i un w, who, in ib.zrm., nee lige ntly t.hr ew it into t he
bathtub wh8r e Dylan W<iS t ak ing his annual b&.th.
Sunny and Cheryl a:)i) ..: <-.-•l <)d from th ) jud (~ l r£ nt a :_;u inst th ;m on the ground
that erroneous instruct.ions had b8 ;n ~i v e n by th ~ tri a l court, to which
instructions proper 0xc e;J tion h a d been t a k cm& 'l.he Suprem-a Court of
Appeals o f Ja . found t h ~ t th e r e w~ s sufficient evidence of n8eli c ence
to support a verdict a &ainst both de fen dants, but th at r ~ versible error
had b ee n cornr~ i tt e d in instructions as t o J un .-l'' w! · ich ~l<llll.Qi e ntitle
him t o a n t;1'\l trial, but. tha't no r e v e rstble G r~ or h a d b e e n COi(lJr,i t ve d as
to Gh.:? ryl.
Und e r tn r.:;se circumst .·ncu s , whP.t action snould the Su!)reme Co'..lrt of
Appeals of V&. t ~ke ?
'l 'he c o urt sbould af/ir,:!

th ~~

jud {~!n

.m t as to

' ~h c ry l

•

ar.:.d r ,1verse and re-

ma11d as to 0unnf .
i'l.s -.:iunn. and r. Jheryl VJ(-; ra ro und to be joint tort~! a s~~s th8y w0 r8_each suvcrally liable f or the ~ ntir e jud ernc nt •

.t:ncrvfor e , r u v c rs J.n ~', as to ::>un n.y or1ly ' ;ould not h a v e t be effect of
incrc::i sinc- Cheryl's liability .
Ch eryl has h ;.:l.d h :1J day in court and
~ould n 0t e~ t a fre ~ rid ~ jus t b e cause error wa s co m .it ct in r e W'~- rd to j unny.
:.>eo 20S va. 214 <:And 205 -.fa . 727.

7 :f~J the trial of an a.otion at law, the record showed only the following proceedings in the Circuit Court with reference to a question asked a witness:
Counsel for plaintiff: "Where were you on the night of this occurrence?'
Counsel for defendant: 11 ! object."
Court: "Objection overruled.n
(a) Assume that there was an adverse judgment and counsel for the defendant applied
to the Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ of error(appeal), and assigned this
action of the Circuit Court as error.
What answer ought counsel for the plaintiff make to this assignment?
(b) Assume that instead of overruling the objection, the reoord showed only:
"Objection sustained11 , and counsel for t~1e plaintiff assigned this action as crosserror. What answer ought counsel for the defendant make to this assignment?
(APPELLATE PROCEDURE) (a) Plaintiff should object to the consideration of the
assignment. There is nothing in the record to show that an exception was made by
defendant to the court's rulings and the ground of the objection was not stated as
required by Rule 1:8 of the Rules of Court-204 Va.634,637
202 Va.300,308.
(b) Counsel for defendant should object to the consideration of the assignment.
There is nothing to show what the answer would have been and in the absence of
this information it cannot be said that it would have been material. 157 Va.699,708.

B.~';? a chancery suit in the Circuit Court a final decree was entered on June 1,
1967, finding among other things that nJane Smith, as widow of Robert Smith, is
entitled to dower in Whiteacre.tt The term of court adjourned June 20th. The finding as to Jane Smith was cle~rly erroneous, as the record showed that Robert Smith
had only a life estate in Whiteacre.
You are consulted on June 26th as to how, if at all, this finding may now be
corrected in the Circuit Court over the objection of Jane Smith.
(EQUITY PLEADING) The finding as to Jane Smith, being clearly erroneous upon the
face of the record may be corrected by filing a bill of review within six months
of the decree. Because the error lies in the face of the record, it is not necessary
to obtain leave of court to file the bill. Va.Code 8-613.

•
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3. An automobile driven by Smith, and in which Plaintiff was riding, collided with

•

•

•

one driven by Jones in the City of Radford, Virginia. Smith died as a result of
injuries received in the accident. Johnson, a resident of Roanoke County, qualified
in the Circuit Court of Montgonery County as Administrator of Smith's Estate.
Plaintiff, Smith and Jones were all residents of Montgomery County.
Plaintiff instituted in the Circuit Court of Roanoke County an action against
Johnson as Administrator of Smith's Estate and against Jones as joint defenaan~s,
seeking to recover for his personal injuries sustained in the accident. The defendants filed pleas in abatement in proper form in which they alleged that the cause of
action did not arise in Roanoke County but in the City of Radford; that Jones did
not reside in Roanoke County but in Montgomery County; and that the personal
residence of the defendant administrator, Johnson, was not sufficient to afford
proper venue in the case.
{a) How should the court rule on the pleas in abatement?
(b) List all proper venues for this cause of ac~ion and state the basis of each.
(c) State the time limitation and the pleading stage at which a plea in abatement
may be properly filed.
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE) {a) The court should sustain the pleas in abatement. The
only basis for suit in Roanoke County was that the administrator resided there.
Section 8-38{1) provides that venue is proper in any county or city wherein any of
the defendants live. But it was legislature's intent that this should apply to a
defendant in his individual capacity and has otherwise specifically provided by n, ·'
#8-38(5) for venue of an action or suit against an administrator where will was
probated or fiduciary qualified.{203 Va.7)
(b) Venue would be proper in: Montgomery County because if is where nany11 or Defendants reside #8-38(1) or where the administrator qualified #8-38(5), and;
City of Radford because the cause of action arose there. #8-39.
(c) The plea in abatement must be filed within twenty-one(21) days after service
of notice of motion for judgment on the defendant. Rule 3:6/
Pleading stage is after service of motion for judgment and must be before {or
simultaneously with) demurring, pleading in bar, or pleading to merits. It need not
be filed upon a special appearance.

4~J January 1,

1964, Patrick received what was believed to be minor injuries in an
automobile accident while a guest in Henry's car. Because of the friendship of the
part.ies Patrick neither instituted an action against Henry nor tried to effect a
compromise settlement. While filling out his income tax return on April 15, 1966,
Patrick became ill and 3 days later he died. His attending physician concluded that
the accident in 1964 wa~a proximate cause of his death. The executor of Patrick's
estate instituted a death-by-wrongful-act action against Henry on June 5, 1967,
in the Circuit Court of Bedford County, Virginia.
With respect to how the accident occurred Plaintiff merely alleged: 11 Henry operated his automobile in which Patrick #88 a guest in a grossly negligent manner, and
as a proximate result of his gross negligence Patrick died."
Henry demurred to the motion for judgment on the ground that it was not sufficient
in law in that it did not set forth the manner in which Henry was grossly negligent
He also filed a plea in which he alleged that the action was barred by the applica-·
ble statute of limitations, without specifying the particular statute relied upon.
Plaintiff filed a motion to strike the plea.
(a) How ought the court to rule on the demurrer?
(b) How ought the court to rule on the motion to strike the plea?
(PLEADING AND PRACTICE)(a) The court should overrule the demurrer. An allegation or
negligence or contributory negligence is sufficient without specifying the particulars of the negligence.Rule 3:18(d).
(b) The court should overrule the motion to strike the plea. An allegation that
an action is barred by the statute of limitations is sufficient without specifying
the particular statute relied on. Rule 3:18(i).
(Note that executor brought action within two years after Henry's death as required by #8-634 and is not demurrable on that ground but the right of action is
dependent (#8-633) upon deceased being able to maintain action if he had survived
and would have been subject to 2 year statute of limitation under #8-24, compl,anoe
with which must be affirmatively set out by the plaintiff.

5 -{t;j

{ ~'j.
~ ana Accused was indicted for embezzlement on April 1

1967

in the Ciro it

~~urt 0 ~ Carroll County, Virginia. She was thereafter ar;ested'pursuant to~

pias lssued.on xhe indictment. Before arraignment her attorney moved the court to

fua~h
t~e ~nd1ctment on the ground that there had been no preliminary hearing prior
0

er 1nd1ctment.
How should the court rule?
The ~ourt should overrule -the motion to quash. The requirement of a
pfellmlnary ?ear1ng in felony eases is not jurisdictional (H19nl-163.1)and purpose
~i ~uch hear1?g was served by the grand jury's finding of probable cause. Pre(2~~~::2t)ar1ng is required only where one is arrested prior to indictment.

(~RO?E~URE)

9.~iJe Circuit Court of Roanoke County granted Plaintiff judgment against the Defendant for $1,500 by its order of January 16,1967. Pursuant to notice to Plaintiff,
the Defendant tendered to that court on March 10, 1967, a "Statement of Testimony."
The statement consisted of a narrative recital of the Defendant's version of the
testimony given by the witnesses. Although the Plaintiff objected that the Statement of Testimony was not accurate and complete, he did not tender a written statement of his version of the evidence.
The trial court, being of the opinion that the Defendant's Statement of Testimony
did not accurately and completely set forth the testimony in the case, declined by
its order of March 15 to certify said statement but did attach it to its order. The
Defendant objected and excepted to the action of the court.
On appeal, the Plaintiff insisted and the Supreme Court of Appeals held that the
several assignments of error concerning the trial court's ruling on the merits of
the case could not be considered because there was no transcript or narrative statement of testimony in the record, as the statement tendered by the Defendant was not
signed by the trial judge.
Under these circumstances what action, if any, sh~uld the Supreme Court of
Appeals take in regard to Defendant's assignment of error relative to the refusal
of the trial court to sign the Statement of Testimony tendered by Defendant?
(APPELLATE PROCEDURE) Under Va. Rule 5:1 paragraph 10, it is stated, "If disagreement as to the contents of a record should arise between counsel •••• ,the question
shall be submitted to the judge and decided by him.n Thus it is the duty of the
trial judge to reconcile any differences and formulate an accurate record. If because of the ~apse of time or lack of memory(as here) the judge cannot accomplish
this result, he should then order a new trial. The case should be remanded to the
trial court with instructions to follow this procedure. See 203 Va.946.

•
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Sept. 14, 1967 Adam Brice, a resident of the City of Richmond, while driving
his automobile through a street intersection in that City, struck and injured
Charles Dow, a pedestrian who resided in Hanover County, Virginia. On October 2nd
Brice and his wife locked up their home in Richmond, leaving no one in charge, and
left for a vacation in Miami, Florida. On October 5th Dow brought an action against
Brice by filing a motion for judgment in the Circuit Court of Hanover County to
recover $2,500 for his injuries. The notice of motion, issued by the Clerk, to
which was attached a copy of Dow's motion for judgment, was delivered to the
Sheriff of the City of Richmond for service. On October 9th, the Sheriff of the
City of Richmond took the notice of motion and the motion for judgment to the
residence of Brice and, finding no one at home, posted the papers on the front door
of the residence and made his return of proof of service to the Circuit Court of
Hanover County. When Mro and Mrs. Brice returned to the City of Richmond on November
27th, Brice was surprised to find that Dow had obtained judgment by default against
him for ~~2,500 in the Circuit Court of Hanover County on November 5th. Brice asks
your advise on(i) whether he may have the judgment set aside for improper service
of process, and(b) whether he may have the judgment set aside for improper venue.
How should you advise him on each of these points?
(VA. PROCEDUHE) The judgment may not be set aside for either reason. Under Virginia
Code 8-51 and the Virginia Rules, substituted service by posting a copy of the
summons on the front door of the person's usual place of abode is expressly allowed.
Brice had not changed his place of abode, but simply left for a temporary vacation.
While the venue was incorrect, Richmond being the proper place of venue, an objection must be raised by a plea in abatement filed within 21 days from service of
process. Under Virginia Rule 3:6, absolutely no extension of time is allowed.
See 204 Va.96.
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June 12, 1967, Henry Brown, the administrator of the estate of Rupert Thomas
deceased, commenced an action in the Corporation Court of Danville against Ervin '
Jackson. In his motion for judgment Brown alleged that on May 30, 1965 Jackson was
driving a motor vehicle in the City of Danville, that Jackson drove his motor
vehicle at a high and unlawful rate of speed into the intersection of First and
Clay Streets, that at the same time Thomas was properly walking across the inter~
section, that Jackson then negligently caused his vehicle to strike Thomas killing
him instantly, and that the estate of Thomas thereby suffered damage for $35,000
for which judgment was sought. Within twenty-one days after being served with the
notice of motion for judgment, Jackson filed grounds of defense in which he denied
that he was driving his motor vehic)(e at a high or unlawful rate of speed at the
time it struck Thomas, denied that he was negligent in the operation of his vehicle
and alleged that Thomas was himself guilty of contributory negligence which caused '
his death. Jackson filed no other pleading. On October 16th, the action was tried
before a jury which returned its verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $25,000.
on the same day the Court entered judgment in that amount for Brown as administrator.
on October 30th, Jackson filed with the Court a motion to set aside the judgment for
Brown and to enter summary judgment for Jackson. As the ground for his motion
Jackson asserted that the judgment in favor of Brown as administrator could not
stand because the action against Jackson had been brought more than two years after
the death of Thomas. Brown opposed the granting of Jackson's motion on the grounds
(a) that the defense of Jackson came too.~ate in that it was not raised before the
jury retired, and (b) that such defense was n?t raised by_a special plea of the
statute of limitations. Should Jackson's mot1on be sus~a1ned?
.
.
(VIRGINIA PHOCEDURE) Both objections are errone?us. A. flnal ~ud~ent rema1.ns ~l~hin
the trial court for a period of 21 days and dur1ng wh1ch per1.od 1t may be ~od1f1ed
rsed under a proper motion. A motion can properly be made to set as1de a
or
reve which is invalid on its face at any t1me
.
dur1.ng
.
th e . 21 days per1o
. d and
judcment
d
t be mad e before the jury retires. Secondly, when a r1ght such as a wrongful
~eethno tion is created by statute then any limitation created by the statute is
_ea
~c f that rieht and must be alleged and proven by plaintiff. A defendant in
13 far 0 tion need not plead the special statute in his defense, but may move the

~~~:ta~oa~et aside any judgment in plaintiff's favor where it is plain that plaintifj
did not bring his action within two years.

See 172 Va. 413.
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Kirby brought an action against Red Apple Grocery Co., Inc. in the Circuit
Court of the City of Hopewell to recover damages of ~~10,000 allegedly sustained as a
result of tainted meat eaten by Kirby after its purchase from Red Apple. Kirby's
pleading was poorly drawn, and Red Apple filed a demurrer to the motion for judgment
on the ground that it failed to state a case upon which relief could be granted.
The Court sustained the demurrer and entered an order reciting: "The Court being of
opinion that the plaintiff's motion , for judgment fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the defendant's demurrer thereto is hereby sustained, to
which action of the Court the plaintiff excepts." Two months after this order was
entered, Kirby moved the Court for leave to amend his motion for judgment. Red
Apple opposed the motion on the ground that the order sustaining the demurrer was a
final judgment and that Kirby's motion to amend came too late.
How should the Cburt rule?
(VA. PROCEDU!!E) The Court should overrule both contentions. A ruling which sustains
a demurrer is not a final over adjudicating the merits of a case. The Court did
not decide the case, but merely held the pleadings to be inadequate. Under Va. Rule
3:13 all matters relating to the filing of pleadings may be reviewed and corrected
by the Court and the time allowed for filing pleadings may be extended by the Court
in its discretion, and such extension may be granted though the time fixed has
already expired. See 194 Va.39h, Rule 3=13,3:21.

•

T.)J:~ior,

an infant of 20 years, entered into a contract to sell Blackacre to
Jones for 1~50,000. When Jones tendered the purchase price, Junior declined to convey
the property. Jones then instituted a suit in the Circuit Court of Albemarle
County, Virginia, against Junior for specific performance. Junior requests you to
assert as his only defense his infancy, He also says that, if possible, he would
like to have a jury trial.
(a) What pleading should you file on behalf of Junior?
(b) Under what circumstances may a jury trial be secured?
(VA. PROCEDURE) In suits in equity in Virginia a defendant may raise a single determinative fact by filing a plea in bar. If such fact is determined in defendant's
favor it will be a complete bar to the other party's claim. Under Va.Code 8-213, a
party raising such a plea in bar is automatically entitled to a right to trial by
jury on this one determinative fact issue. See 204 Va.4 and Phelps p.32.
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